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INTRODUCTION

The year 1982 saw the publication of Carol Gilligan's In a Different
Voice.' In general, Gilligan, drawing on her own work and that of
others, undertook to establish that differences in the approaches of
men and women to moral and social structuring issues are based on
a different way of approaching ethical and social issues.' She found
that males emphasize the autonomy of individuals and an ethos of
rights in their approach, whereas females emphasize communitarian
values and an ethos of care.' Gilligan labeled neither approach as
superior. Each provided useful, but different, modes for resolving
moral and social issues.4
Some legal scholars seized upon Gilligan's work as providing
justification for creating new modes for evaluating existing legal rules
and creating new rules.' These scholars, who are sometimes grouped

1.

CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:

PSYCHOLOGIcAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S

DEVELOPMENT (1982).
2. See id. at 1-23.

3. Id- at 73, 100.
4. Id. at 167-74.
5. Se4 eg., Leslie Bender, Changingthe Values in TortLaw, 25 TULSA LJ. 759, 767-73 (1990)
[hereinafter Bender, Changing the Values] (stating that Gilligan's work can help alter moral
vocabulary of tort law by changing meaning of word "responsibility" in law); Leslie Bender,
Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis,Mass Torts, Power and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE
LJ. 849, 895-96, 901-08 [hereinafter Bender, Feminist (Re)torts] (stating that woman's different
voice, as applied to tort law, would improve system by making legal responsibility more multidimensional); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primeron Feminist Theory and Tort, 38J. LEGAL EDuC. 3,
4, 28-37 (1988) [hereinafter Bender, A Layerr Pnimerj (presenting major components of
feminist theory and illustrating how they can be used to critique tort law); Kenneth L. Karst,
Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 461-63 (describing Gilligan's analysis of female
approach to relationships as "web of connection" and proposing that application ofweb theory
to constitutional law will yield greater protections under U.S. Constitution); Carrie MenkelMeadow, Portia in a Different Voice Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 41-63 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia] (proposing that scholars
must analyze lawyering by using Gilligan's observations of differences in male-female moral
reasoning now that there are more women in formerly male-dominated legal profession);Judith
Areen, A Need for Caring,86 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1073-78 (1988) (book review) (applying care
perspective to battle against AIDS). For a more extensive presentation ofscholarship based on
Gilligan's work, see KATHARINE T. BARTLEr, GENDER AND LAW 589-670 (1993) and Leslie

Bender, Irom Gender Diffeence to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in
Law, 15 VT. L REV. 1, 1-2 n.2 (1990).
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together under the label of the "cultural feminist school" ofjurisprudence,6 claim that the existing legal construct, which was largely the
product of a male-dominated society, is preoccupied with individual
Basing legal rules on
autonomy and an ethos of rights.7
communitarian values and an ethos of care would result in the
making of dramatically different choices. These scholars assert that
basing a jurisprudence on an ethos of care, rather than an ethos of
rights, will result in different legal rules governing issues such as
negligence,' racial discrimination,9 rights of AIDS victims,"° and the
distributive impact of taxation."' Unlike Gilligan, cultural feminists
often see the ethos of care as superior to the ethos of rights and see
the changes that would be wrought in the legal system by application
of the ethos of care as improvements on the present state of the

law.12
The purpose of this Article is to test, in the context of redistributive
justice,"3 the basic postulate of cultural feminist jurisprudence-that
men and women approach major societal issues differently so that
were we to listen to woman's different voice, different choices would
6. SeePatriciaA. Cain, Feminism andthe Limits ofEquality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 835-38 (1990)
(describing cultural feminists as those feminists who focus on women's differences from men
and embrace idea that "woman's different voice" is "good").
7. See, e.g., Bender, Changingthe Values, supranote 5, at 767 (stating that current tort law
concerns only fiscal responsibility and not responsibility of taking care of others); Bender,
Feminist (Re)torts, supranote 5, at 903-04 (concluding that because tort law was created by men,
ethic of rights dominates field); Bender, A LaPer ;Priaer,supra note 5, at 31-32 (noting that tort
law is premised on rights and separation rather than responsibility and interconnectedness);
Karst, supranote 5, at 462 (recognizing that American law is predominately abstract hierarchy
of rights rather than web of interconnectedness); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virrtue and the Feminine
Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. Ray. 543, 544-45 (1986) (stating that modern
paradigm of political and moral philosophy is individualistic); Areen, supranote 5, at 1072-78
(arguing that society should not punish transmission of AIDS, but should approach problem
from caring point of view).
8. SeeBender, A Lawyers Primer,supranote 5, at 32 (proposing that under care perspective,
duty of care required by negligence would mean "acting responsibly towards others to avoid
harm, with a concern about the human consequences of our acts or failures to act").
9. See Karst, supra note 5, at 491-93 (stating that care approach to racial discrimination
cases will result in abandonment of "state action" doctrine).
10. SeeAreen, supranote 5, at 1079-80 (concluding that if care perspective were applied to
issues surrounding AIDS, people without HIV would care for those with HIV and would assist
with screening and education programs, but that application of justice perspective ignores
necessity of care for HIV infected individuals).
11. See Marjorie Korahauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 465, 507-23 (1987) (concluding that care perspective
supports progressive income taxation because female view emphasizes relatedness to others and
progressive tax is "means by which individuals fulfill their responsibilities to others").
12. See infra notes 21-75 and accompanying text.
13. Byredistributivejustice we mean those processes whereby resources are transferred from
those who have them in abundance to provide for the social and economic needs of those with
scant resources. In our society, this is most commonly achieved with a combination of
progressive tax measures and public spending programs which disproportionately provide for
the needs of those with minimal resources.
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be made about legal solutions to social problems. To this end, we
employed conventional polling techniques and statistical analysis to
determine if there are significant gender-based differences in the
degree of support for a number of redistributive justice issues. We
chose to test support for redistributive justice because, if the cultural
feminists are correct, the combined effect of the female-oriented
ethos of care with its emphasis on communitarianism and the maleoriented ethos of rights with its emphasis on individuality should
result in women being dramatically more supportive than men of
progressive tax measures and of social spending measures that benefit
the disadvantaged and the effectively disenfranchised. We selected for
our study two tax and six spending issues that we believed were
politically typical and were good reflections of an individual's position
on redistributive justice.
If, as cultural legal feminists claim, men, in their approach to moral
issues, favor an ethos of individual rights and justice, and women favor
a communitarian ethos of care, and if these different perspectives can
be expected to translate into different choices about legal rules and
programs for addressing social problems, we believe that this should
reveal itself in different levels of support by men and women for
programs that address redistributive justice issues. This Article first
provides a general review of the schools of feminist jurisprudence:
(1) cultural feminism; (2) liberal feminism; (3) radical feminism; and
(4) post-modem feminism. Following is a discussion of the methodology that we employed in gathering the data for our analysis. Next, we
set forth our general conclusion followed by a detailed analysis of the
data by first focusing on social spending and then on tax fairness
issues. Following is a more detailed statement of our conclusions and
an appendix, which provides, in technical format, the data we
developed.
The data that we developed and our analysis of it provide no
support for concluding that the differences between males and
females observed by Gilligan will, if we favor one voice over another,
translate into different choices being made by society in resolving
issues of redistributive justice.
I.

SCHOOLS OF FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE

Any attempt to classify the various ways that feminists theorize about
legal issues is bound to be subject to criticism. Rather than being
monochrome, much feminist scholarship resembles a painting where
the artist has made use of a number of the colors on the pallet to
provide us with her work of art. Nonetheless, for purposes of
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simplifying the discussion, it is useful to identify the four major
schools of American feminist jurisprudence.
Although various scholars employ different labels in characterizing
the different schools of feminist jurisprudence, for purposes of this
Article we accept the four classifications that Professor Patricia Cain
has established: (1) cultural feminism; (2) liberal feminism; (3)
radical feminism; and (4) post-moder feminism. 4
Because cultural feminism posits that gender alone can account for
the different approaches made by men and women as solutions to
social problems, we believed that it was possible to test empirically the
cultural feminist postulate by employing conventional polling
techniques and statistical analysis. In our discussion of the various
schools of feminist jurisprudence we focus first on cultural (or
relational) feminism since it is central to our inquiry. We then
consider briefly the other schools of feminist jurisprudence before
presenting our empirical analysis.
A.

CulturalFeminism

The cultural feminist movement is principally based on the work of15
Professor Carol Gilligan, an educational psychologist at Harvard.
Professor Lawrence Kohlberg, an educational psychologist at Harvard
and Gilligan's one-time collaborator, established a theory and scale of
cognitive moral development under which men generally outperformed women.'" According to Kohlberg, individuals who reach full
moral maturity pass through six distinct stages of moral development.17 In the first two stages, moral judgment is based on an

14.
15.
16.

Cain, supra note 6, at 829-41.
See Cain, supra note 6, at 835-41.
SeeLawrence Kohlberg, MoralStagesand Moralization: The Cognitive-DevelopmentApproach,

in MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR:

THEORY, RESEARCH AND SOCIAL ISSUES 31, 31-53

(Thomas Lickona ed., 1976) [hereinafter Kohlberg, MoralStages] (describing six stages of moral
development). For additional works by Kohlberg on this subject, see LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OFJUSTiCE (1981) (using

six stages of moral development to appraise problems of education, philosophy, moral
philosophy, and humanities); Lawrence Kohlberg, Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral
Development Revisited, in LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENrAL PSYCHOLOGY: PERSONALrIYAND SOCIALIZATION
179, 179-204 (Paul B. Baltes & K. Warner Schaie eds., 1973) (addressing question of existence
of adult stages and change in stages throughout moral development); Lawrence Kohlberg, The
Development of Moral Judgment and Moral Action, in CHILD PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILDHOOD
EDUCATION: ACOGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTALVIEW259 (1987) (reviewingfindingson development
of moral judgment and moral character necessary for informed concern for moral education);
Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive-Development Approach to Socialization, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAUZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 342, 347-480 (David A. Goslin ed., 1971)
(applying six stages of cognitive-development to phenomenon of moral socialization and
considering processes of imitation and identification from this perspective).
17. Kohlberg, MoralStages, supra note 16, at 31-33.
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individual's own understanding of that individual's wants and
needs.18 Persons who advance beyond this will come to realize that
social normative values, and not personal wants and needs, are what
should constrain and compel their conduct. 9 Those who reach the
two highest levels of moral development, according to Kohlberg,
critically evaluate accepted social norms and form moral judgments
based on abstract concepts of moral right.2" Studies conducted using
Kohlberg's scale indicated that men tended to advance further than
women toward full moral maturity.2
Gilligan eventually undertook to challenge Kohlberg's work.2 2 The
principal result of her endeavor was her already mentioned work, In
a Dfferent Voice, wherein she challenged Kohlberg for positing a moral
hierarchy centered on a male-oriented ethos of justice or rights.2"
Gilligan asserted that the female-oriented ethos of care should be
accorded equal dignity in creating a moral hierarchy and in making
judgments about relative moral maturity.24
Gilligan's central exposition of the different approach of females
and males in dealing with moral issues involves one of Kohlberg's
moral hypotheticals.' The hypothetical dilemma involved a situation
where Heinz's wife is in desperate need of a drug that can save her
life but Heinz cannot afford to purchase the drug from the pharmacist. 26 The responses ofJake, a typical young boy, and Amy, a typical
young girl, illustrate the different levels of moral development
reached by each gender under Kohlberg's scale of moral develop27

menL

18. Kohlberg, Moral Stages, supra note 16, at 34-35.
19. Kohlberg, Moral Stages, supra note 16, at 34-35.
20. Kohlberg, Moral Stage.; supra note 16, at 34-37, 49-51.
21. See GILUGAN, supra note 1, at 18-23, 25-31, 54-55, 72-73 (describing studies that were
based on Kohlberg's six-stage theory of moral development). These studies indicated that
women are deficient in moral development because theirjudgments exemplified the third stage
of the six-stage sequence. Id. at 18.
22. GILLiGAN, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that female moral judgments reach only third
stage in Kohlberg's six-stage scale, but such deficiency is paradoxical because traits that women
possess, which cause low rank on Kohlberg's scale, are those traits for which women are often
praised-caring and sensitivity to needs of others); seeJoan C. Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference
to a Theoy of Care, 12 SIGNS 644, 647-48, 648-49, n.12 (1987) (describing Gilligan's In a Different
Voice as book that addresses problems with Kohlberg's theory and discussing theoretical dispute
between Kohlberg and Gilligan). For a helpful analysis of the impact of Gilligan's theory, see
Anne-Marie Turnier, The Political Ramifications of Femininity: Maternalist Theory in
Perspective (Jan. 27, 1992) (unpublished undergraduate thesis, Smith College, on file with The
American Univesity Law Review).
23. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 18-23.
24. GILiGAN, supranote 1, at 167-74.
25. See GILuGAN, supra note 1, at 25-39; Kohlberg, Moral Stages, supra note 16, at 33-40
(setting forth hypothetical moral dilemmas used by Gilligan).
26. GILIUGAN, supra note 1, at 25.
27. GILuGAN, supra note 1, at 26-39.
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Jake quickly sees the moral dilemma as involving a conflict between
the right to life and the right to property.2 He realizes that the
former is more important than the latter and concludes that theft of
the drug is morally justifiable. 9
Amy, on the other hand, is torn between stealing the drug and
confronting the death of Heinz's beloved wife."0 She seeks accommodations, such as a loan, whereby Heinz might obtain the drug
without stealing it and sees the druggist's failure to provide a
mechanism whereby Heinz can obtain the drug as providing the
8
principal moral issue in the scenario. '
Gilligan tells us that Kohlberg would have us believe that Amy's
reactions were indicative of her inability to view the dilemma as
involving a clash between two rights, which occupy different places in
a moral hierarchy, and her inability to address the proper choice in
this conflict between morally unequal principles.3 2 Amy's response is
reflective of a level of moral development, which Kohlberg would find
inferior to that of Jake. 3 Gilligan sees Amy's response as the result
of a moral insight, which does not value abstract moral principles as
much as it values sustaining concrete harmonious interpersonal
relationships.' Amy's approach, which emphasizes accommodating
the interconnectedness of all involved in moral conflicts, should be
contrasted and compared with, but not subordinated to, Jake's rightsoriented approach to the dilemma.3 5
As support for the proposition that males and females employ
different modes of resolving moral conflict, Gilligan notes that studies
of children at play demonstrate that groups of young boys and groups
of young girls at play manifest different ways of dealing with cheaters. 6 Boys tend to remonstrate with the transgressor and ostracize
him from the group." Girls, if they fail in their effort to have all play
by the rules, will change the game to maintain cohesion of the
group3 8 Each group seeks to carry out worthy goals-strict enforcement of rules and maintenance of group cohesion-and each reflects
values that are useful for social organization. Gilligan asserts that the

28.
29.

GILIuGAN, supra note 1, at 26.
GILuGAN, supra note 1, at 26-27.

30. GILuGAN, supra note 1, at 28.
31.
32.

GILUGAN, supra note 1, at 27-29.
GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 28-31.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

GmJGrAN. supra
GILmIAN, supra
GILLIGAN, supra
GnLIGAN supra
GILuGN supra
GILUc, supra

note
note
note
note
note
note

1, at 29-30.
1, at 29-31.
1, at 31-32.
1, at 10-11.
1, at 10-11.
1, at 10-11.
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ethos of rights, which characterizes the male approach to moral
issues, and the ethos of care, which characterizes the female approach, make equally valuable social and moral contributions and that
neither is superior to the other.8 9 Contrast this with some later
cultural feminists who imply the superiority of the results that follow
from application of the ethos of care.40
Gilligan also posits that males define themselves by separation from
others, whereas females define themselves by identification or
connection with others." Although Gilligan does not speculate on
the cause for such differences, some cultural feminists, such as
Professor Nancy Chodorow, perceive that these differences develop
early in life.42 For example, when young boys notice the physical
difference between themselves and their primary caregivers, their
mothers, they place themselves on the path toward defining themselves through separation or individuation. 4 Young girls, on the
other hand, notice the physical similarities between themselves and
their mothers, and consequently proceed to define themselves and
others based on connectedness, not separation.4 4 Thus men see first
the self, the individual, whereas women first see the connectedness
of us all in a web.'
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow describes this feature of cultural
feminism:
In tracing through the sources of these different approaches to
moral reasoning, Gilligan's analysis tracks that of Chodorow,
Dinnerstein and Noddings. Men, who have had to separate from
their differently gendered mother in order to grow, tend to see
moral dilemmas as problems of separateness and individual rights,
problems where choices must be made and priorities must be
ordered. Women, who need not completely separate from their
same gendered mother in order to grow, see the world in terms of
connections and relationships. "While women thus try to change

39. GILLIGAN, supranote 1, at 167-74.
40. See Bender, Feminist (Re)torts, supranote 5, at 767-73 (arguing that application of female
"voice" to tort law would improve system by redefining "responsibility" as more multidimensional); Karst, supra note 5, at 491-93 (concluding that application of care perspective to
constitutional issues will result in greater number of litigants seeking access to Supreme Court);
Areen, supranote 5, at 1079-80 (asserting that applying care perspective to AIDS crisis will yield
better results than present application ofjustice perspective).
41. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 34-35, 55.
42. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 57-76 (1978) (positing that gender differences start at infancy).
43. Id. at 108-10.
44. Id.
45. GILLIGAN, supra note 1, at 7-8 (summarizing theory of child development that holds that
"masculinity is defined through separation while femininity is defined by attachment").
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the rules in order to preserve relationships, men, in abiding by

these rules, depict relationships as easily replaced." Where men see
danger in too much connection or intimacy, in being engulfed and

losing their own identity, women see danger in the loss of connection, in not having an identity through caring for others and by
being abandoned and isolated.'

Although Gilligan does not see the ethos of care and the ethos of
rights as the exclusive moral preserves of women and men respectiveto favor the moral
ly, she finds that each gender tends strongly
47
perspectives that she attributes to that gender.
Recent critics of Gilligan have accused her of attacking a straw
person. For example, Professor Lawrence Walker analyzed sixty-one
studies that employed the Kohlberg paradigm to compare moral
reasoning for each sex.4" His study indicated that through adolescence, there was no perceived trend of differences in scores between
males and females.49 Although some studies of adult males and
females did report higher scores for males in Kohlberg's scale of
cognitive moral development, Walker found that the difference was
explained by differences in education between the tested females and
males, with the former being less well educated than the latter."0
Once adjustment was made for this gap, Walker reported that no
significant difference remained in scores of males and females.
Nonetheless, despite questions about such shortcomings in her work,
Gilligan's message that there is both a male-oriented and a femaleoriented approach to moral reasoning has spawned a school of
feminist jurisprudence that cannot be ignored.
Gilligan's work and the related jurisprudence are having a significant impact on present legal thought. To gain some measure of its
46. Menkel-Meadow, Portia,supra note 5, at 47 (quoting CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 44 (1982)). In a similar vein,
Suzanna Sherry asserts that "[f]eminist scholars identify three primary dichotomies between
while women emphasize connection, subjectivity, and
men's and women's thinking:
responsibility, men emphasize autonomy, objectivity, and rights." Sherry, supranote 7, at 582.
47. See Carol Gilligan, Moral Orientation and Moral Development, in WOMEN AND MORAL
THEORY 19, 25 (Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987) (positing that approximately
one-third of each gender speaks in both voices and about two-thirds of each gender speak solely
in the voice which she assigns to it).
48. Lawrence T. Walker, Sex Differences in theDevelopment ofMoralReasoning.A CiticalReview,
inAN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMINIST AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 157, 157-76 (MaryJeanne
Larrabee ed., 1993).
49. Id. at 162-66.
50. I& at 166-71.
51. I& at 171-75; see Catherine G. Greeno &Eleanor E. Macoby, How Different Is the "Different
Voice"?, inAN ETHIC OF CARE: FEMINIST AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPEcTIvEs 193, 194-95 (Mary
Jeanne Larrabee ed., 1993) (analyzing Walker's studies and concluding that "there is no
indication whatever that the two sexes take different developmental paths with respect to moral
thought about abstract, hypothetical issues").
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relative importance on recent scholarship, we conducted a computerized search of law review articles that cited her work and were
published between January 1, 1989, and January 1, 1995. We
discovered that Gilligan was cited in 357 articles. To gain some sense
of the significance of this achievement, we conducted a similar search
for other major contributors to legal philosophy examining the same
time period and report the number of citations in parenthesis
following their names: Lord Coke (111); Learned Hand (895);
H.LA. Hart (539); Oliver Wendell Holmes (733); John Stuart Mill
(507); Roscoe Pound (441); andJohn Rawls (617).52 The comparison
is dramatic and demonstrates that the community of legal scholars
seriously considers Gilligan's work and the work of the cultural
feminists.- s
Legal cultural feminists focus on Gilligan's observed differences
between men and women and demand that society pay equal, or
more, attention to women in creating its legal constructs. They assert
that virtually all our existing legal system is the product of the male
ethos of rights. They believe that, were society to listen to a woman's
different voice, it would construct a somewhat different set of legal
rules and mechanisms for resolving legal problems. 54 Some commentators attribute the origin of the different voice to biology (nature);"
others attribute it to environment (nurture);56 and still others find it
52. The search was conducted on Lexis by looking for all entries listing the last name in
question and a first initial or name starting with the first initial of the first name of the party.
It is possible that on a few occasions extraneous material was generated that is included in the
above comment. However, each of the names in question are equally likely to generate such
material, and thus the relative comparisons remain valid. Search of Lexis, Law Rev. library,
Allrev file (Mar. 9, 1995).
We also note that the above methodology, because it counts only books and articles authored
by these individuals, does not measure the full impact on legal thought of members of the
judiciary such as Judge Hand and Justice Holmes whose judicial opinions are typically cited
without indication of authorship.
53. While we concede that not every citation of Gilligan is by a scholar who subscribes to
the cultural feminist movement, the same can be said of the work of the other individuals that
we searched. The bottom line remains that cultural feminism is a major current of
jurisprudential thought in this era.
54. See supra note 5 (describing differences between male and female perspectives and
impact of different voices on law).
55. See Daniel Goleman, Special Abilities of the Sexes: Do They Begin in the Brain?,PSYCHOL

TODAY, Nov. 1978, at 48, 56 (concluding that at least some differences in aptitudes between men
and women may be neurologically determined); Diane McGuinness & Karl H. Pribram, The
Origins of Sensory Bias in the Development of Gender Differences in Perception and Cognition, in
CoGNITivE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF HERBERT G. BIRCH 1, 5-6, 48
(Morton Bortner ed., 1979) (concluding that sex differences in perception and cognition are
not due to environmental contingencies but to biological differences that account for differing

sensory capacities).
56. See CHODOROW, supra note 42, at 28-82 (positing that gender differences begin with

child's relationship with its mother, its primary caretaker); DOROTHYDINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID
AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MAIAISE 28-32 (1976) (stating that

1996]

REDISTRmIUTIV JUSTICE AND CULTURAL FEMINISM

1285

unnecessary to determine its origin."
Cultural feminists see the different voice of women as having two
distinct impacts on our legal system. First, as members of the legal
profession, women are viewed as having a potential impact on the
profession, with female attorneys and judges approaching and
resolving legal conflicts in a fashion that differs from the behavior of
their male counterparts.18 Second, if society were to base its substantive rules on an ethos of care, rather than the existing male-oriented
ethos of rights or justice, different fundamental choices would be
made, choices that reflect care and connectedness rather than
individual rights and separation. 9
1.

CulturalFeminism and the Legal Profession

Professors Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ° Suzanna Sherry,6" and Kenneth
Karst62 provide good examples of cultural feministjurisprudence that
holds that woman's different voice has the potential to change the
way the legal profession functions.
Professor Menkel-Meadow indicates that women, because of their
emphasis on the ethos of care and their concern about preserving
relationships, would move society away from its win-lose confronta-

differences between men and women begin with different relationships each sex has with its
mother boys see their mother as different but girls see her as similar).
57. See generally CAROL TAvais & CAROLE OFFIR, THE LONGEST WAR: SEX DIFFERENCES IN
PERSPECTIVE (1977) (examining sex differences from five different perspectives: biological,
psychoanalytic, learning, sociological, and evolutionary without proclaiming "correct" reason for
differences between men and women). For a discussion of the nature versus nurture issue, see
Turnier, supra note 22, at 28-50. Despite debates about origins, Patricia Cain has observed:
"[w] hetherviewed as natural or socially constructed, woman's capacity for caring and connection
has provided substance for an interesting debate between radical feminist MacKinnon and
cultural feminist Gilligan." Cain, supranote 6, at 837.
58. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 5, at 39-41 (stating that "women's entry into formerly
male-dominated fields has changed both the knowledge base of the field and the methodology
by which knowledge is acquired").
59. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
60. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal ProfessionMaking New
Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L REv. 29, 44-46 (1987) (proposing that influx of women in legal
system will result in less adversarial modes of dispute resolution, which would flow from women's
desire to care for others); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, FeministLegal Theorg, CriticalLegal Studies, and
Legal Education or "The Fem-Cits Go to Law School", 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 71-85 (1988) (arguing
that application of feminist critical theory to legal education will result in alternatives to
conventional legal education such as substituting consciousness-raising groups or other nonhierarchical learning methods for traditional socratic method); Menkel-Meadow, Portia,supra
note 5, at 41-63 (applying Gilligan's care perspective to lawyering process to evaluate legal
profession from both male and female "voices").
61. See Sherry, supranote 7, at 580-613 (arguing that feminine perspective in judiciary will
result in changing interpretations of Constitution).
62. See Karst, supra note 5, at 491-93 (concluding that feminine perspective will result in
abandonment of "state action" requirement).

1286

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSnIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1275

tional, adversarial trial system toward a system that emphasizes mutual
respect and conciliation.' 3 She posits:
In sum, the growing strength of women's voice in the legal
profession may change the adversarial system into a more cooperative, less war-like system of communication between disputants
where solutions are mutually agreed upon rather than dictated by
an outsider, won by the victor, and imposed upon the loser. Some
seeds of change may already be found in existing alternatives to the
litigation model, such as mediation.6
She suggests that, as counselors, female attorneys might better
understand the range of a client's needs and objectives because it is
in the lawyer-client relationship where the values of care and
responsibility for others will be most directly applicable.' Professor
Menkel-Meadow believes that women's tendency to personalize and
contextualize problems may lead female attorneys to a fuller
understanding of the complexities of their clients' legal problems.6 6
She also suggests that female judges are likely to approach the trial's
quest for resolution of conflict differently, with male judges emphasizing justice, and female judges emphasizing mercy and a resolution
acceptable to all.6
Professor Sherry, as a result of her examination of a number of
Justice O'Connor's opinions that deal with the Establishment Clause,
discrimination, and what she described as community perspective
issues, reports to have found within them evidence of the presence of
a woman's different voice.'a She claims to have found ample

63. Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supranote 5, at 50-55.
64. Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 5, at 54-55.
65. Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 5, at 57.
66. Menkel-Meadow, Portia, supra note 5, at 58.
67. Menkel-Meadow, Portia,supra note 5, at 59.
68. See Sherry, supranote 7, at 592-611. Sherry, drawing on the work of cultural feminists
such as Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan, posits that contemporary men and women have
distinctly different perspectives on the world that prompt each to opt for differing political and
jurisprudential theories. IMtat 543-50. She asserts that the cultural feminist perspective favors
the classical communitarian, virtue-based framework ofJeffersonian republicanism whose central
theme is connection rather than autonomy. Id at 580-92. Under this theory of government,
a citizen most fully exists as a member of the community. Idat546-49. Here, "[r]elationships
among individuals are more important than the discrete, abstract individual themselves." Id. at
547. Individual liberty is presumed to be synonymous with public liberty, and individual
fulfillment comes from sharing in the collective autonomy. Id. at 548. According to Sherry, this
form of classical republicanism, with its communitarian values and belief that the purpose of
government was the ennobling of the human spirit, underlay the American Revolution but was
eventually replaced by a Lockean liberalism, which subsequently formed the basis for the
American Republic and Constitution. Id. at 541-60. Sherry asserts that classic liberalism shifted
the focus of the purpose of government to the protection of private aims and interests, exalting
the citizen as individual over the citizen as member of the community. Id. at 550-62. This was
accomplished "by shifting the function of government from promoting and perfecting human
nature to protecting the exercise of individual human nature." Id. at 560. Classic liberalism saw
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evidence of Justice O'Connor displaying more concern with
communitarian values than her male counterparts on the Court.69
Professor Sherry also reported that her reading ofJustice O'Connor's
opinions indicated that they displayed greater concern with
contextuality and less emphasis on bright-line rules and abstract
decisionmaking than do the opinions written by the male members
of the Court.7" Professor Sherry concedes that, despite Justice
O'Connor's use of a different value system in reaching judicial
decisions, this has yet to translate into positions on issues that are at
variance with those of her conservative male colleagues on the
Court.7
Professor Karst is a cultural feminist who believes that the different
voice of female judges on constitutional issues is likely to translate
72
into different opinions on substantive constitutional issues.
Professor Karst's colleague, Professor Menkel-Meadow, aptly summarized his opinion of the potential of female judges to change our
understanding of the Constitution:
He suggests that women's concern for "webs of connection" might
result in a more inclusive reading of the equal protection clause.
Further, he suggests that the values in the Constitution may derive
from a male conception of freedom that is expressed in terms of
freedom from the interference of others. For example, the rights
of liberty, property, due process and equality express a desire for

the adoption of the Constitution as necessary to promote safety and prosperity. Id. Sherry
observes that individualism, as embodied in the Bill of Rights, became the hallmark of American
political ideology. It at 560-62. Sherry identifies this breed of classic liberalism, which has
characterized our jurisprudence for the past two hundred years, with the ethos of rights or
justice. Id. at 559-62, 582-83.
According to Sherry, there has been a resurgence of interest in classic republican theory that
parallels, or perhaps is impelled, by women's increasing participation in the political processes
and the development of cultural feminist theory based on the work of scholars such as Nancy
Chodorow and Carol Gilligan. ldtat 580-81. The emphasis of cultural feminism on
communitarianism and contextuality compliments classic republicanism's concern with such
values. it at 574-91.
69. See Sherry, supra note 7, at 592-604 (stating that Justice O'Connor's emphasis on
communitarian values is evident in her Establishment Clause decisions where she often
characterizes "government endorsement of religion as a detriment to one's membership in the
community, rather than as a violation of one's individual rights," and in her discrimination
decisions where justice O'Connor seems "reluctan[t] to accept conduct that condemns groups
of individuals to outsider status").
70. See Sherry, supranote 7, at 604-13 (describingJustice O'Connor's opinion in Bearden
v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983), in which she refused to focus on whether to apply due process
or equal protection analysis and instead inquired into factors surrounding indigent's failure to
pay fine and restitution).
71. See Sherry, supranote 7, at 613.
72. See Karst, supra note 5, at 463-508 (stating that introduction of ethos of care to
settlement of social conflict would cause courts to "redefine the idea of discrimination" by
recognizing that law's discriminatory impact, rather than discriminatory purpose, established
constitutional harm).
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separation from the government and from others. In essence, our
basic liberties are expressed as individual liberties rather than as
collective rights.
Karst evocatively suggests that a women's voice of care and
connection might lead to doctrinal changes in the areas of state
action in discrimination law and in the state's affirmative duty to
assist all its members to be able to fully participate in the community. Thus, our conception of state responsibility under the Constitution might be enlarged, and a conception of "responsibility" might
supplement or replace altogether our notion of individualistic
constitutional "rights." Karst also suggests that the political context
of lawmaking, particularly in the constitutional arena, would be
more likely to be expressly involved in legal decisionmaking with a
stronger women's voice by explicitly providing for more participation by women on the theory that they have something unique to
contribute. Most interesting in Karst's analysis is the notion that
the very terms of our constitutional and legal vocabulary might be
redefined with a women's voice in greater evidence; words such as
liberty, autonomy and equality might come to mean different things
when expressed with a women's voice or looked at in a women's
73
context.
2.

Culturalfeminism and procedural and substantive law

Cultural feminists have speculated even more concretely regarding
the potential of a woman's different voice to have impact on specific
areas of procedural and substantive law. In general, they believe that
the ethos of care and woman's sense of connectedness will result in
substantive rules that reflect less of abstract concepts of individual
rights and more of concern about the injured and isolated. Much of
the existing body of law is considered to be the result of society's
having structured its procedural and substantive laws based on a maledominated ethos of rights and justice.7
If,however, society based
its system of laws on the feminine ethos of care, cultural feminists are
75
of the opinion that different choices would have been made.
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that cultural feminists believe
that the ethos of care would produce different answers on issues
intimately affecting women, such as discrimination and maternity
leave.76 Indicative of the vision of cultural feminists for the potential

73. Menkel-Meadow, Portia,supranote 5, at 60-61 (footnotes omitted).
74. See, e.g., infra notes 76-108 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., infra notes 76-108 and accompanying text.
76. See, ag., Lucinda M. Finley, TranscendingEqualiUy Themy: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the WorkplaceDebate,86 CoLUM. L REv.1118, 1122 (1986) (saying that ethos of care wouldcreate
new approach to state laws regarding availability of maternity leave and to legal debate

surrounding special treatment versus equal treatment of sexes); Karst, supra note 5, at 480-508
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of woman's different voice to produce sweeping fundamental change
in our legal system is the fact that the theory has found application
79
78
77
in areas of the law as diverse as bankruptcy, taxation, torts,
corporations," ° and the legal rights of AIDS victims." To illustrate
the far reaching impact of this school of jurisprudence, it is worthwhile to explore the work of several cultural feminist scholars in these
areas.

Professor Judith Areen has written on the subject of AIDS,
comparing likely responses to this issue under the ethos of care and
the ethos of rights.8 2 Areen indicates that a different approach to
the AIDS issue would be taken under the care perspective, which she
identifies with women, than would be taken under the justice
perspective, which she identifies with men."3 She posits:
A justice perspective.... would ignore the need of people with
HIV for care, beyond ensuring that they are not discriminated
against in the provision of medical services or in other ways. The
focus would be on deterring such individuals from harming others
by transmitting the virus. Public policy founded on a justice
perspective, therefore, would emphasize punishing the knowing
transmission of HIV. Repeat offenders might even be quarantined. 84
Areen indicates that under the care perspective, government would
provide medical and emotional care for AIDS victims and would

(stating that adding women's voice to legal arena would cause courts to "redefine the idea of
discrimination, abandoning the requirement of a showing of discriminating purpose, in favor
of a principle recognizing a law's discriminatory impact as a constitutional harm requiring
justification by the state").
77. See Karen Gross, Re-Ysion of the Bankrupty System: New Images of IndividualDetos, 88
MICH. L. REv. 1506, 1554-56 (1990) (applying feminist approach to bankruptcy law reveals that
it is male-oriented field and that it is symptomatic of female povertization).
78. SeeKornhauser, supranote 11, at 507-23 (saying that female perspective of tax law would
result in application of progressive tax).
79. See Bender, A Laayer Pimer, supranote 5, at 4, 28-37 (critiquing tort law by applying
major tenets of feminist theory to its current state); Bender, Changingthe Values, supranote 5,
at 760 (proposing that different voice will alter tort vocabulary by changing meaning of
responsibility); Bender, Feminist (Re)torts,supranote5, at 895-96, 901-08 (concluding that feminist
ideology would change ideology of tort law from individualist to interconnectedness).
80. SeeTeresaA. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and OtherRefletions on the Limited
Liability of CorporateSharholders, 45 VAND. L REV. 1387, 1446-56 (1992) (stating that feminists
would disapprove of concept of limited liability but support concept of limited risk).
81. See Areen, supranote 5, at 1078-82 (applying feminist care perspective to AIDS battle
would lead people to ascertain HV status of others, to avoid transmission, and to protect those
infected from discrimination).
82. See Areen, supranote 5.
83. See Areen, supranote 5, at 1073, 1079.
84. Areen, supranote 5, at 1079 (footnotes omitted).
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address problems through
education, self responsibility, voluntary
85
testing.
and
restraint,
Professor Leslie Bender, one of the leading cultural feminists asserts
that our present system of tort law is the product of the male ethos
of justice. She suggests that if society were to listen to a woman's
different voice, different substantive and remedial rules would result.
She states:
We need to shift from a rights-based focus to a focus on both
care and rights/justice, from power-over to empowering, from the
priority of the market and money to a priority of personal relationships, health, safety, and human dignity in deciding personal injury
disputes. The solution is not to substitute one paradigm for
another, but rather it is constructing a new paradigm
that melds
86
the valuable components of both approaches.
Professor Bender observes that our system of tort laws incorporates
concepts and norms that are the products of concern for economic
efficiency and a male-dominated ethos of rights or justice. 7 If the
system were to reflect the feminine ethos of care with its central
values of connectedness and responsibility, Professor Bender argues
that different substantive rules would result." For example, she
observes that "[f] rom a feminist perspective the duty of care required
by negligence law might mean 'acting towards others to avoid harm,
with a concern about the human consequences of our acts or failure
to act.'" 89 She suggests that a tort system based on an ethos of care
might never have developed the doctrine that bystanders at the sight
of a tragedy have no duty to rescue a victim.90 The ethos of care
might instead be expected to impose a duty to act responsibly toward
victims of impending disaster where assistance could be granted at no
risk to the rescuer.9 She also suggests revising our law of remedies
from a feminist perspective; supplementing money damages by
requiring the wrongdoer, especially in mass torts, to care personally
for the victims of their wrongdoing.9" Professor Bender also asserts

85. See Areen, supra note 5, at 1079.
86. Bender, Feminist (Re)torts, supranote 5, at 907.
87. Bender, A Lawyers Primer,supranote 5, at 30-31; Bender, Changingthe Values, supranote
5, at 767; Bender, Feminist (Re)torts, supranote 5, at 903-04.
88. Bender, A Lawyers Prime,; supra note 5, at 31-32.
89. Bender, A Lawyer's Prime, supranote 5, at 32.
90. Bender, A Lawyers Primer,supra note 5, at 33-34.
91. Bender, A La-yers Primer,supranote 5, at 33-36.
92. Bender, A Lawyer's Prime,; supranote 5, at 36-37; see Bender, Changing the Values, supra
note 5, at 767-73 (applying feminist theory to define responsibility in tort as "taking care of" tort
victims, including "direct, personal services of caregiving" ranging from "shopping, transportation and arranging for medical treatments, to retraining or educating, to feeding and aiding in
personal hygiene care, to rebuilding self-confidence, and even spending time with the injured
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that, in mass tort suits, the feminist perspective also warrants our
"alter[ing] burden-shifting rules by placing the risks of nonproduction
and nonpersuasion on the more-empowered party to the litigation,
which in mass tort would probably be a corporate defendant." 93 She

suggests that, to empower the unempowered, tort law could be altered
so that the filing of a claim in a mass tort action would result in
raising a rebuttable presumption of liability that operates against the

corporate defendant. 4
Cultural feminists have also noted the potential for the ethos of
care to reshape commercial law. For example, Professor Theresa
Gabaldon finds the existing corporate law doctrine of limited liability

to be inconsistent with cultural feminist values9' because the doctrine
distances individuals from the effects of their investments, thus
decreasing their acknowledged personal responsibility.9" According

to Professor Gabaldon, a system of corporate laws designed by
feminists would reflect the connectedness of all, investor and
97
consumer, as well as our mutual responsibility toward each other.
Such a system of laws, she asserts, would not include as one of its
features the limited liability doctrine.9"
Professor Karen Gross contends that, in the debtor-creditor context,
we appear to have designed "[a] bankruptcy system based on a onegender (male) image of debtors and with an unsophisticated
approach to the moral dilemma confronting individuals who cannot
repay their creditors." 99 She asserts that certain debtors, especially
women, are uncomfortable with the abrupt disruption of the debtorcreditor relationship present in the liquidation option provided by

person and treating her with dignity and importance") (footnote omitted); Bender, Feminist
(Re)torts, supra note 5, at 895-906 (rejecting notion that responsibility for tort injuries merely
means making reparations and advocating "remedies that respond to victims' needs for
community, care, and relationships [while requiring] responsible individual defendants to
perform the physical and emotional caregiving work").
93. Bender, Changing the Values, supranote 5, at 764 (footnote omitted); see also Bender,
Feminist (Re)torts, supranote 5, at 878-95.

94. Bender, Changingthe Values, supranote 5, at 764.
95. See Gabaldon, supra note 80, at 1428-30.
96. Gabaldon, supra note 80, at 1429.
97. Gabaldon, supra note 80, at 1428-29.
98. Gabadon, supra note 80, at 1429, 1445-48. Gabaldon recognizes that immediate
restructuring of corporate law along feminist lines is unlikely and suggests the acceptance of
several lesser steps consistent with basic feminist goals. Id. at 1445. She views greater investor
empowerment and requirements that businesses carry adequate insurance as the minimal
corrective steps that could be taken short of eradication of limited liability. Id at 1448-54. For
Gabaldon, both would represent steps in the right direction reflective of a greater awareness of
key cultural feminist values of connectedness and mutual responsibility. Id.
99. Gross, supranote 77, at 1541 (foomote omitted).
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Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code."° Professor Gross recognizes
that solutions that go to the root of the problem, such as eradication
of structural social features leading to women's impoverishment and
replacement of the adversarial bankruptcy process with mediation, are
not likely to be realized soon. 10' She observes that, in the short
term, cultural feminist values implicit in the work of Professor Gilligan
suggest that we respond to this problem by humanizing the bankruptcy process.10 2 Professor Gross suggests that bankruptcy proceedings
provide individual debtors with financial and personal counseling as
well as give debtors a chance to tell their own stories rather than by
checking blocks on official forms or in response to the questions of
creditor attorneys. 0 3
Professor Marjorie Kornhauser, a feminist tax scholar in the arena
of public finance, believes that the female voice provides strong
4
support for progressive income taxation because'0
[t] he female voice emphasizes our relatedness to others. It builds
bridges rather than barriers. In this sense, the feminist vision is
aligned with other communitarian visions such as classical republicanism, whereas the male vision more closely follows the pluralistic,
individualistic, liberal theory of today.'0 5
She sees this feminist vision of humanity not merely as supportive
of, but compelling, progressivity.1° Recognition of the relatedness
of all members of society requires acceptance of redistributive
progressive income taxation as a means for individuals to fulfill their
responsibility to others.0 7 Presumably, those individuals that adhere
to the ethos of rights or justice with its emphasis on individual
autonomy could be expected to favor proportional taxation of
income1ta

100. Gross, supra note 77, at 1541. Bankruptcy proceedings commenced under Chapter 7
of the Code generally entail collecting the debtor's property, selling the property and
distributing the proceeds of the sale to creditors. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1994). Typically,
however, Chapter 7 proceedings discharge debtors without any distribution to unsecured
creditors, with secured creditors taking all the debtor's assets or the debtor retaining the assets
pursuant to various exemption laws. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 449 (1993).
101. Gross, supra note 77, at 1544.
102. Gross, supra note 77, at 1545.
103. Gross, supra note 77, at 1545-46.
104. Komhauser, supra note 11, at 504-18.
105. Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 511.
106. Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 518.
107. Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 518.
108. Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 498-504. Professor Kornhauser does acknowledge that
payments of the ethos can support progressive taxation in a variety of philosophical reasons
which are independent of the ethos of rights. Among the reasons for their support of
progressive taxation she cites: (1) the benefits theory of taxation; (2) maintenance of
preconditions of negative liberty, (3) political arguments that too unequal a distribution of
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As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, cultural feminists view
woman's different voice as having the potential to produce dramatic
changes in the legal profession, the judiciary, and in our procedural
and substantive laws. While men center their value systems around
abstract concepts such as justice and a system of rights based on
individual autonomy, women emphasize interconnectedness and
center their value systems around preservation of relationships, care,
and responsibility. With these two positions as starting points, cultural
feminists theorize about the potential impact of women's voice for
changing the legal profession and various features of our system of
procedural and substantive law. We believe that, given the basic
predicate of cultural feminism that women possess perspectives on
moral issues that differ from those of men, it is most appropriate to
weigh that impact of those perspectives and to verify theoretical
speculation by analyzing the opinions held by a broad-based,
scientifically selected sample of women and comparing it with the
opinions held by a similar group of men. We will undertake that task
on the issue of redistributive justice. We have chosen redistributive
justice as the focal point for our study because we believe that if
cultural feminism's theoretical postulate about the greater commitment of women to communitarianism and care is correct, this should
manifest itself in women being more supportive than men of
redistributive justice measures. Before setting forth the results of our
study and analysis of the data generated by that study, we will briefly
describe the remaining three schools of feminist jurisprudence.
B. LiberalFeminism
The liberal feminist school holds that women are autonomous
19
beings endowed with the same basic rights and privileges as men.
It rejects all attempts to deny women the full array of rights and
privileges of citizenship offered to men. °
The struggle for women's rights throughout the nineteenth and all
but the closing days of the twentieth century has been largely the

wealth may harm society; and (4) appreciation of the value of a form of social insurance
inherent in redistribution justice. Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 519-23.
109. For discussion of liberal feminism, see Cain, supra note 6, at 829-32; Marion Crain,
FeminizingUnions: Challengingthe GenderedStructureof Wage Labor,89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1207-19
(1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theoy, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 827 (1988)
(reviewing CATHAINE A. MACKNNON, FEINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)) (referring to liberal

feminism as "difference" school "which argues that women should be permitted to compete on
equal terms with men in the public world").
110. Cain, supra note 6, at 829-32; Crain, supra note 109, at 1207-19.
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1
For example, the Declaration of
product of legal liberalism."
Sentiments adopted at the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention was
patterned after the Declaration of Independence with "Man"
substituted for "King George."112 It stated that "all men and women
are created equal; they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit
The intellectual underpinnings of the early
of happiness."" 3
American women's movement are attributed to the legal liberal
philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, such as Mary
Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, and Harriet Taylor, all of whom
14
played major roles in applying liberal theory to women's issues.
The women's suffrage movement of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century combined liberal feminism's emphasis on equality
of the sexes with cultural feminism's celebration of gender differences
in the successful battle to win the vote for women."' In the midtwentieth century, when women sought to better their social, political,
and economic positions, they patterned their efforts after those of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), which had relied on the rights-oriented liberal jurisprudence in making its assault on Jim Crow segregation." 6 It is under
the banner of liberal feminism that women have won most of their
legislative and judicial victories, including equal pay, benefits, access
to employment and education, 7 the right to serve on juries,"'

111. See MARY BECKER ET AL, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 1-16
(1994) (detailing historical background of feminist legal theory); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE
AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 12-14 (1989) (explaining influence of
liberalism on early feminists); ALICE FELT TYLER, FREEDOM'S FERMENT 424-62 (1944) (providing
classic discussion of legal liberalism movement in pre-Civil War period).
112. TYLER, supranote 111, at 453-54; The DeclarationofSentiments, reprintedin BECKER ET AL.,
supranote 111, at 3-6.
113. Declarationof Sentiments, supra note 112, at 3.
114. See RHODE, supranote 111, at 12 (noting that works of Mary Wollstonecraft and John
Stuart Mill provided foundation for views of early American liberal feminists); Cain, supra note
6, at 829 & n.101 (acknowledging contributions of early liberal feminists Mary Wolistonecraft
and Harriet Taylor).
115. RHODE, supra note 111, at 14-19.
116. BECKER ET AL, supra note 111, at 17-18.
117. See, e.g., Equal PayAct of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)) (requiring employers to pay members of both sexes same wages for equivalent work
unless specified exception applies); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tide VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 253 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17)
(outlawing, inter alia, discrimination in employment on basis of sex); Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.) (amending Title VII to provide effective enforcement powers largely in
response to employment practices that, while neutral in from, disparately impact women and
minorities in practice); City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
711 (1978) (holding that pension plan requiring larger contributions from female employees
unlawfully discriminated on basis of sex); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973)
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and the right to choose to terminate a pregnancy.119 Some of the
leading adherents of this school are Professors Wendy Williams,
Herma Hill Kay, and Nadine Taub, although its most prominent
representative is Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 2
Commencing in 1971, while a member of the Rutgers University law
faculty, she, with the cooperation of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), participated in a number of lawsuits that challenged
gender-based discrimination in a variety of contexts.12 ' A series of
victories all based on legal liberalism quickly followed. In Reed v.
Reed,122 the Court invalidated a statute that preferred men over
24
women as administrators of estates.'2 In Frontiero v. Richardon,
the Court held that the families of female military officers were
entitled to housing and benefits on the same basis as were the families
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 126 the Court struck
of male officers."
down portions of the Social Security Act that awarded child care
benefits only to mothers and not to fathers of deceased covered
workers."2 Some critics have attacked the legal liberal basis of these
endeavors because they were based on formal equality of the sexes,
reaping victory for women willing to be treated like men.12 Others
have criticized the willingness of the liberal feminists to represent

(concluding that statute that regarded spouses of male service members as dependents for
purposes of obtaining increased allowances and benefits, but regarded spouses of female
members as dependents only if they were dependent for more than one-half of their support,
unlawfully discriminated on basis of sex).
118. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (finding that jury selection system
granting automatic exemption to women violated accused's Sixth Amendment right to trial by
jury selected from representative cross-section of community).
119. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (recognizing woman's qualified right to
terminate her pregnancy). Because pregnancy is a uniquely female experience, it might be
tempting to suggest that ajudicial decision regarding its termination cannot be based on liberal
feminist jurisprudence and must be a victory of cultural or radical feministjurisprudence. At
the time of the Court's decision in Roe, liberal feminism was the leading feminist school of
thought. Moreover, even a cursory reading of the decision reveals that the Court's opinion was
based on relatively conventional liberal concepts of privacy. Recently, the Court employed
language that indicated that it was receptive to listening to arguments and employing reasoning
based on the cultural feminist perspective. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 85153 (1992) (recognizing that "[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on
her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society").
120. See Cain, supra note 6,at 829-30 (noting Ruth Bader Ginsburg "spearheaded" much of
constitutional litigation brought on behalf of women).
121. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought
of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHi.LEGAL FoRUM 9, 11, 14-17 (discussing ACLU Women's Rights Project
and its impact on gender-based discrimination).
122. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
123. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
124. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
125. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973).
126. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
127. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975).
128. See Ginsburg & Flagg, supranote 121, at 17 n.32 and accompanying text.
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male plaintiffs in cases such as Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.129 Justice
Ginsburg has characterized such criticisms as unfair given the
accomplishments of the endeavor."' Indeed, in a judicial and
legislative climate dominated by legal liberalism, it is hardly surprising
that most, if not all, of the advancements made for women's rights
have been made by proponents of legal liberalism.
C. RadicalFeminism
Radical feminists view the existing cultural, social, economic, and
legal differences between men and women as the product of male
domination.'
They typically reject cultural feminism for failing to
realize that the female characteristics that are central to their thesis
are also the product of male domination.1 12 Similarly, they criticize
legal liberalism for ignoring the reality of male power and domination
in formulating the seemingly neutral principles of liberalism's agenda
83
of sexual equality."

Professor Catharine MacKinnon is a major spokesperson of this
movement.' 4 Two examples, taken from her work, illustrate the
basic approach of this school of feminist jurisprudence. The liberal
viewpoint on abortion, which prevailed in Roe v. Wade, sees the issue

129. Ginsburg & Flagg, supra note 121, at 17 n.32 and accompanying text.
130. See Ginsburg& Flagg, supranote 121, at 17 (asserting that litigation of 1970s succeeded
in "unsettl[ing] previously accepted conceptions of men's and women's separate spheres ...
thereby add[ing] impetus to efforts ongoing in the political arena to advance women's
opportunities and stature").
131. See Crain, supranote 109, at 1188-90 (discussing tenets of radical feminism); Sunstein,
supra note 109, at 828-30 (presenting radical feminist argument that gender inequality stems
from male domination).
132. See Crain, supranote 109, at 1188-90. A leading proponent of this particular school is
Catharine Maclinnon. See CATHAmNE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 51 (1989) (criticizing cultural feminists' emphasis on gender differences rather than
dominance). MacKinnon observes:
A... failure to situate thought in social reality is central to Carol Gilligan's work on
gender differences in moral reasoning. By establishing that women reason differently
from men on moral questions, she revalues that what has accurately distinguished
women from men by making it seem as though women's moral reasoning is somehow
women's, rather than what male supremacy has attributed to women for its own use.
When difference means dominance as it does with gender, for women to affirm
differences is to affirm the qualities and characteristics of powerlessness. Women may
have an approach to moral reasoning, but it is an approach made both of what is and
ofwhat is not allowed to be. To the extent materialism means anything at all, it means
that what women have been and thought is what they have been permitted to be and
think. Whatever this is, it is not women's, possessive. To treat it as if it were is to leap
over the social world to analyze women's situation as ifequality, in spite of everything,
already ineluctably existed.
I& (footnote omitted).
133. See MACKINNON, supra note 132, at 244-49.
134. See Cain, supra note 6, at 833 (noting impact of MacKinnon's ideology on radical
feminism).
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of reproductive control in the context of a framework of privacy,
personal liberty, and autonomy of the individual.13 Radical feminism asserts that a host of factors including social pressure, learning,
economic disadvantage, sexual force, inadequate contraception, and
weak laws against sexual assault have all resulted in a world where
women do not control the circumstances under which they become
pregnant 3 6 Abortion is needed to redress a woman's basic lack of
control over the process of reproduction."'7 Forced maternity is
viewed as a perpetuation of sexual inequality."s
The issue of
pornography is another issue that sharply delineates the differences
between liberalism and radical feminism. Legal liberalism views
pornography in the context of freedom of speech and individual
autonomy,3 9 whereas radical feminism sees pornography as dehumanizing traffic in women that sets the standard for mistreatment of
women, engendering "rape, sexual abuse of children, battery, forced
prostitution, and sexual murder.""4 By its very nature, pornography
contributes to, and defines, women's social and legal inequality. 4 '
The attempts of radical feminism to restrict pornography have fallen
victim to the dominant forces of legal liberalism that pervade our
legal system's approach to speech issues.142
135. See supra note 119 (discussing authors' jurisprudential classification of this opinion).
136. SeeMACKINNON, supranote 132, at 246 (asserting that"women are socially disadvantaged
in controlling sexual access to their bodies").
137. See MACKINNON, supra note 132, at 246.
138. See MACKINNON, supra note 132, at 246 (declaring that compelled motherhood is form
of sexual inequality); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 YALE
Lj. 1281,1319-20 (1991) ("Because pregnancy can be experienced only by women, and because
of unequal social predicate and consequences pregnancy has for women, any forced pregnancy
will always deprive and hurt one sex only as a member of her gender.").
139. See MACKINNON, supra note 132, at 247. See generally Nadine Strossen, In Defense of
Freedom andEquality: TheAmerican Civil Liberties Union Past, Presentand Future,29 HARV. C.R.-C.L
L. REV. 143 (1994). Professor Strossen, who is a former president of the ACLU, asserts that legal
liberalism's opposition of radical feminists' drive to censor pornography is twofold:
First, they contravene free speech principles. Second, they undermine women's
equality rights by giving government officials a powerful tool for suppressing works by
and about feminists and lesbians; by perpetuating demeaning stereotypes about
women, including that sex is bad for us; by perpetuating the disempowering image of
women as victims; by distracting us from constructive approaches to reducing
discrimination and violence against women; and by undermining free speech, thereby
depriving feminists of a powerful tool for advancing women's equality.
Id. at 151 (footnote omitted).
140. MACKINNON, supranote 132, at 247.
141. MACKINNON, supranote 132, at 195-214.
142. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332 (7th Cir. 1985) (ruling
anti-pornography ordinance violated First Amendment), aft'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Radical
feminism, however, may have earned a victory with the Supreme Court's unanimous acceptance
of sexual harassment as an impermissible form of sex discrimination. See Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 75 (1986) (acknowledging that sexual harassment is actionable as sex
discrimination under Tide VII); Sunstein, supra note 109, at 829 (crediting MacKinnon for
providing intellectual basis for victory in Winson, although her work may reflect more of liberal
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D. Post-modernFeminism
Post-modem feminists reject all suggestions that there is a universal
essential woman or female experience that can serve as a measure of
society's legal mistreatment of women. 4 3 They assert that the
originators of the women's movement are largely white, middle and
upper-middle class, heterosexual, college-educated women.'" Postmodernists criticize the movement for focusing on such individuals
and allowing their values, concerns, and experiences to define the
feminist movement."
Liberal, cultural, and radical feminists are all
criticized for having created an essential female whom they use to
understand women's diverse experiences and problems, putting forth
the solutions of her problems as the solutions to the problems of all
1 46
women.

Critical race feminism, with Professors Angela Harris, bell hooks,
and Kimberle Crenshaw serving as that movement's leading spokespersons, 47 provides the most graphic example of post-modern
feminism. Professor Harris notes that, although white feminists decry
their inability to cause the male-dominated legal system to treat rape
with appropriate seriousness, their cause is simpler than that of the
black rape victim who experiences the sting of both racism and
gender bias as she approaches the legal system."4 While praising
the work of radical feminists such as Professor MacKinnon, Professor
Harris criticizes it for relying on "gender essentialism-the notion that
a unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and
described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other
49
realities of experience."
Professor Patricia Cain notes that a significant problem, which postmodernism poses for feminist jurisprudence, is that it deprives

rather than radical perspective).
143. For a brief thoughtful discussion of this school ofjurisprudence, see Cain, supranote
6, at 838-41 (observing that post-modem feminists reject notion of "essential woman"), Crain,
supra note 109, at 1191-92 (classifying post-modernist jurisprudence as critical race feminist
jurisprudence). Although both Cain and Crain use different labels, they are classifying the same
group of legal thinkers.
144. See Crain, supranote 109, at 1191.
145. See supra note 143 and infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text (discussing views of
post-modem feminism).
146. See supra note 143 and infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text (examining postmodem feminists' criticism of liberal, cultural, and radical feminism).
147. See Cain, supranote 6, at 839; Grain, supra note 109, at 1191-92.
148. SeeAngela P. Harris, Race andEtsentialim in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.REV, 581,
590-615 (1990) (attacking notion of "essential woman" by introducing experience of black
women).
149. Id. at 585.
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feminist jurisprudence of the abstraction and generalization so
The embracing of the realities of all
essential to much theory.'
women-old and young; rich and poor; black, white, yellow, and
brown; heterosexual and lesbian; as well as educated and uneducated
with all possible permutations and combinations-will make it
difficult, Professor Cain asserts,5 to build a unified theory that women
can use to further their cause.1 1
I.

METHODOLOGY

We decided to measure the validity of some of the claims of the
cultural feminists and, to the extent that they are related, of the other
schools of feminist jurisprudence by analyzing polling data on two
significant redistributivejustice issues: (1) support for social spending
and (2) support for tax fairness. 5 2 Given cultural feminist assertions about the potential impact of the ethos of care for changing
substantive law and the profession and their emphasis on women's
heightened appreciation of our connectedness and responsibility
toward one another, we fully anticipated that women would be more
supportive than men of redistributive justice in the form of social
spending and tax fairness measures. Such a result, we believed, would
be consistent with cultural feminists' claims that concerns about
connectedness and communitarian values should manifest themselves
in support for changes in our laws. In addition to determining the
impact of gender on opinions about redistributive justice issues, we
were also interested in determining whether support for feminism
would have a significant impact on respondents' level of support
because we believed that this might have some impact on the feminist
orientation of our study.

150. See Cain, supra note 6, at 839 (recognizing that theories all require some level of
"abstraction and generalization").
151. See Cain, supra note 6, at 839 (arguing that feminists must unite behind single theory
to fight oppression).
152. In the initial phases of our research, using Harris Poll data, we sought to determine
whether there were significant differences between the attitudes of men and women with respect
to the principle of a progressive rate structure for income taxation. Seven different polls from
1948 to 1990 contained valid questions on this issue.
Analysis of the data indicated that there was no statistically significant difference between the
attitudes of men and women on this issue. Because Harris Poll data would not allow us to make
the type of regression analysis that we wished to carry out on a series of issues using a group of
variables key to our analysis, it was necessary for us to conduct original research on a national
poll. It is significant, but not surprising, that the Harris Poll data referred to above is consistent
with the findings of our study.
Harris Poll data is available at the Institute for Research in Social Sciences at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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The data used in our analysis was generated by the Institute for
Research in Social Science of the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. In the fall of 1992, the Institute conducted an extensive
national telephone poll, the 1992 Southern Focus Poll, which
employed random digit dialing. The poll in question oversampled in
the South. 153 To correct for the oversampling, responses were
weighted to reflect a national random sample of persons aged
eighteen or older living in households.
To test attitudes regarding redistributive social spending, we chose
six issues that have figured prominently in national debate during the
past few decades. Respondents were asked the following:
The government is being asked to pay for many different kinds of
programs these days. People disagree about how fair it is to ask
taxpayers to support some of them. Would you say it is very fair,
somewhat fair, somewhat unfair or very unfair to spend government
money on safe houses for victims of spouse abuse?

Subsequent questions addressed: (1) housing for the homeless; (2)
job training for the unemployed; (3) medical care for AIDS patients;
(4) loans for college students; and (5) preservation of endangered
species. Responses on these six spending questions were combined
to form an index of spending fairness. A response of "very unfair"
was given a numerical weight of one, "somewhat unfair" was weighted
two, "somewhat fair" was weighted three, and "very fair" was weighted
four. The resulting potential index range was from six to twenty-four
for each person polled.l"
153. The sample included 4054 southern and 2804 nonsouthem numbers, with 4920
numbers actually called. Interviews were completed for 46.8% of the households reached with
an eligible respondent. An interview was not completed where a respondent refused to answer
all questions or the interviewer or respondent had to terminate for a reason such as time
constraints or a call was cut off. The number of households contacted and the response rate
were within normal parameters for a reliable survey. For more details about the survey, contact
the Institute of Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
154. Responses were somewhat skewed toward positive perceptions. For example, ignoring
"don't know" responses, those answering "very fair" ranged from 37.3% for spending on saving
endangered species to 59.4% for spending on job training for the unemployed. The mean of
spending index for all respondents was 19.89, with a standard deviation of 3.23 and an alpha
of 0.73. Deleting the endangered species item increased the alpha level modestly from 0.7338
to 0.7339 and deleting any other item decreased it significantly, thus justifying retention of all
items in the index.
The alpha value is used to test whether several different items in a survey are reliably
measuring a similar underlying concept. The alpha is placed on a scale of 0 to +1.0. A high
alpha indicates that the respondents are responding in a similar manner to the items in a survey
that the analysts believe to be related. An alpha as high as that produced by the six tested items
is very positive and indicates that the six items reliably tap a common underlying attitude on
social spending. See generally LeeJ. Cronback, Coeficimnt Alpha and the InternalStructure of Tests,
16 PSYcHOmETRwA 297 (1951) (discussing "alpha test").
The following chart summarizes the responses on each of the six issues. All figures represent
the percentages of respondents who chose a particular response.
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To test attitudes regarding redistributive taxation, we chose two
issues that have figured prominently during the past few decades in
national debates regarding tax issues, the progressive tax system and
the preferential treatment of capital gains. Responses from the two
items were combined to create a tax fairness index. Responses
strongly supportive of redistributive tax policies 55 were assigned a
value of four, those that merely supported such measures were
assigned a value of three, whereas those who were opposed were

Table A

Safe Homes for Abused
Housing for Homeless
Job Training
AIDS Medical Care
College Loans
Endangered Species

Very

Somewhat

Somewhat

Very

Don't Know and

Fair

Fair

Unfair

Unfair

No Opinion

40.5
38.8
54.1
38.1
53.1
30.9

40.0
43.5
35.3
39.2
35.6
40.6

10.7
9.6
6.1
9.4
5.8
13.2

4.1
5.2
2.5
7.5
3.2
9.6

4.7
2.9
2.0
5.8
2.3
5.7

Following conventional procedures, "don't know" and "no opinion" responses were dropped
to analyze data with the result that percentages referred to elsewhere in the study will vary
slightly from those reported above. "Don't know" and "no opinion" responses, of course, are
declared missing data in the regression results.
155. The two item tax index generated an alpha of only 0.32. This indicates that the two
core issues around which tax policy has been debated over the last decade do not reflect, as well
as our spending fairness measure, a single dimension of citizen orientation toward public policy.
Although public policy analysts typically view these two issues as significant individual features
of the redistributive tax issue, the low alpha value indicates that the public recognizes only a
modest relationship between the two issues. Weak public knowledge about tax issues most likely
accounts for this.
We analyzed the two factor tax fairness index given Kornhauser's implied assertion that there
is a single dimension underlying tax fairness issues. See Konmhauser, supra note 11, at 468-69
(suggesting that two principle arguments underlying objection to progressive tax as being
unfair---"market efficiency" and philosophy of "individualism"-are so closely related as to
actually be one concept). We also looked at each of the individual items comprising that index.
A response of "very fair" to the progressive tax question or "strongly disagree" with capital
gains preference was deemed to be strongly supportive of redistributive taxation and was
assigned a score of four. Responses of "somewhat fair" or "disagree" on the respective issues
were deemed to be somewhat supportive of redistributive efforts and assigned a score of three.
Responses of "unfair" or "agree" on the respective issues were assigned a score of two while
responses of "very unfair" or "strongly agree" on these issues were assigned a score of one.
The tax fairness index had a mean value of 5.10 and a standard deviation of 1.48. In
responding to the progressive tax question, 20.3% of the respondents answered "very fair,"
36.5% answered "somewhat fair," 22.8% answered "somewhat unfair," 11.8% answered "very
unfair," and 5.5% had "no opinion." In addressing the capital gains question, 17.9 % answered
"strongly agree," 25.3% answered "agree," 21.2% answered "disagree," 5.5% answered "strongly
disagree," and 30.2% had "no opinion." Following standard practices, the "no opinion"
responses were declared missing data when statistical analyses were conducted.
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assigned a value of two, and those strongly opposed were assigned a
value of one. The resulting potential index ranged from two to eight.
To test opinions regarding tax progressivity respondents were asked
the following:
The federal income tax is based on the principle that people with
higher incomes not only pay more taxes but also a greater
percentage of their incomes in taxes. Do you think this is very fair,
somewhat fair, somewhat unfair or very unfair?
A second question focused on the capital gains issue and asked:
Some say that capital gains--that is the profits people make from
the sale of investment property, stocks and so forth-should be
taxed at a lower rate than their income from wages and interest.
Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree or have no
opinion?
Our central theoretical interests concerned gender and feminism.'5 6 Our indicator of feminist identification for males and
females was constructed using three questions. Respondents were
asked whether they thought of themselves as feminists.15 7 Those

156. In our study, gender is a dummy variable scored one for women and zero for men. A
dummy variable is defined as "a nominal-level variable coded with values of 1 and 0 and used
in a regression." KENNETH J. MEIER & JEFFREY L BRUDNEY, APPLIED STATISTICS FOR PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 444 (3d ed. 1992).
157. Given the potential problems with measures based on self-identification, we initially
examined a more complex measure of feminist identification. This involved combining our
present measure with another based on questions about whether one was proud of the
accomplishments of women. In analyzing the results, however, we found the use of the more
complex measure reduced our sample size due to missing responses on the "pride" component
of the index. Therefore, we used the simpler measure based on self-identification employing
self-report data.
Does this mean that our use of self-identification is problematic? Two reasons suggest not.
First, when the analyses presented here were re-run using the more complex measure of feminist
identification, albeit with fewer observations, they produced in all cases essentially the same
findings. Thus, our simpler measure based solely on self-report does not seem to bias the
responses or their relationships with attitudes about public policy.
Second, this finding conforms well with previous work on measures of feminist identification
based on self-report data when such measures are augmented, as ours is, with information about
intensities of preferences. Thus, Professor PamelaJohnston Conover reports that her measure,
which is similar to ours,
is very strongly correlated with positive affect (as measured by feeling thermometers)
toward women (Pearson's r=-.33), the women's movement (r=.53), and the women's
liberation movement (r=-.50). It is also positively related to aspects of group
consciousness. In particular, a strong feminist identity is associated with the position
that the government should "make every effort to improve the social and economic
position of women" (r=.28), and that it is extremely important that the government act
now on that issue (r=.33). Finally, a strong feminist identity is also positively related
to having a sense of interdependence with other women; that is, strong feminists
believe that if "women were more actively involved in running the affairs of this
country" it would increase the respect that they personally receive (r--.28). Thus, the
measure of feminist identity taps the underlying concept more directly than previous
measures, and it is correlated in the expected fashion with crucial criterion variables.
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responding affirmatively were asked if they would describe themselves
as strong or not so strong feminists. Those responding negatively
were asked if they were strongly opposed, not so strongly opposed, or
not at all opposed to feminism. 5 Curiously enough, when responses on these questions were compared with respondents' gender, there
was only a weak correlation between gender and feminist identification.

159

The models used to assess the impact of gender and feminist
identification on perceptions of redistributive fairness in taxation and
social spending also included a number of other control variables."6
The demographic variables included age,"' education,162 income,16 and race.'" We also created control variables
for political ideology" and political party identification. 66 To determine

PamelaJohnston Conover, Feminists and the Gender Gap, 50J. PoL, 985,991-92 (1988). For both
reasons, then, self-identification should provide a valid measure of the concept we are

attempting to tap in this analysis.
158. The responses were combined to create a five-item indicator of feminist identification.
"Strong" feminists (11.06% of the respondents to this question) were assigned a value of five;
a value of four was assigned to "not so strong" feminists (26.83% of respondents); a value of
three was assigned to respondents who responded negatively but who indicated that they were
not opposed to feminists (30.58% of respondents); a value of two was assigned to those who
were "somewhat opposed" to feminists (25.81% of respondents); and a value of one was assigned
to those who were "strongly opposed" to feminists (5.72% of respondents).
159. Gender and feminist identification indicators were so weakly correlated that they
produced a Pearson correlation coefficient of only 0.085. A Pearson correlation coefficient
ranges between -1.0 to 1.0 and is used to indicate the relationships between the two items. A
score of 1.0 would indicate perfect positive correlation between two items (e.g., all women are
strong feminists and all men are strongly opposed to feminism). A value of -1.0 indicates a
perfect negative association between two variables. Ascore ofzero indicates random correlation.
The reported score of 0.085 indicates very weak positive correlation between gender and
feminism.

See THOMAS H. WoNNAcoTr & RONALD J. WONNAcOTT, INTRODUCTORy STATISTICS

407-16 (5th ed. 1990) (discussing Pearson correlation coefficient).
160. Control variables are variables or categories, such as age or income, which are not the
primary focus of inquiry, but are introduced to insure that the key relationship is not spurious.
In our study, for example, age, education, liberalism, income, race, and party identification are
the control variables. The variables that are the focus of our study are gender and feminism and
the two multiplicative interaction variables ofgender-feminism and gender-party identification.
See infra notes 167-70 (explaining concepts of multiple regression analysis and multiplicative
interaction).
161. The age variable was based on the year of birth.
162. Respondents were asked if their highest year of completed school was: (1) less than
grade nine; (2) grade nine through eleven; (3) high school graduate; (4) some college; (5) fouryear college graduate; or (6) more than four-year college graduate.
163. Annual income was coded in $10,000 increments until $60,000 and more than $60,000
per year.
164. Respondents were coded as white or non-white.
165. Respondents were asked to indicate if they were a: (1) strong conservative; (2) not so
strong conservative; (3) moderate leaning conservative; (4) moderate; (5) moderate leaning
liberal; (6) not so strong liberal; or (7) strong liberal. In creating variable values, high values
were assigned to liberalism and low values to conservatism.
166. Respondents were asked to indicate if they were a: (1) strong Republican; (2) not so
strong Republican; (3) Independent leaning toward Republican; (4) Independent;
(5) IndependentleaningtowardDemocrat; (6) notsostrongDemocrat; or (7) strongDemocrat.
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if male and female feminists had different perceptions of
redistributive fairness in taxation and spending, we created a
multiplicative interaction variable167 designated as gender-feminist
identification.a Given Professors Pamela Johnston Conover and
Virginia Sapiro's finding on the interaction of party identification and
gender in attitudes about national defense, we also included such an
interaction variable in our models. 69
We employed multiple regression analysis"7 ' to interpret the

In creating dummy variable values, high values were assigned to Democrat respondents and low
values to Republican respondents.
167. Interaction variables are produced by multiplying the values of two or more
independent variables. The resulting product is then included as a separate independent
variable in the regression model along with the variables from what it is composed. SeeWILLAM
DALE BERRY & STANLEY FELDMAN, MULTIPLE REGRESSION IN PRACTICE 51-57, 64-72 (1985)
(discussing interpretation of interaction terms).
168. Multiplicative interaction terms allow us to assess the non-additive impact of two or
more variables in the model. A standard regression model might include gender (scored one
for women and zero for men) and feminism as separate and distinct independent variables. A
standard model may also assume that the relationship of the targeted variables to a dependent
variable, such as support for redistributive spending, is merely additive. Other models may
assume that the coefficient for the feminism variable should be the same irrespective of whether
the respondent was a man or a woman. By including in our model a multiplicative term,
formed by multiplying gender by feminism, in addition to the gender and feminism variables,
we were able to test for differences in the impact of feminism on support for redistributive
spending between men and women. The impact of feminism for men is indicated by the
feminism coefficient while the impact of feminism for women is the sum of the feminism and
multiplicative interaction coefficients. Thus, the multiplicative interaction coefficient indicates
the difference in the impact of feminism on support for redistributive spending between men
and women. SeeBERRY & FELDMAN, supranote 167, at 51-57, 64-72 (1985) (discussing interaction
terms).

169. SeePamelajohnston Conover & Virginia Sapiro, Genden Feminist Consciousness, and War,
37 AM.J. POL So. 1079, 1087 (1993) (discussing interaction of party identification and gender
on attitudes about public policy). In short, the authors find that partisanship has a far more
significant impact on men's attitudes about war than it does on women's attitudes. Id.
170. Multiple regression analysis is a technique used to estimate the independent or distinct
impact of one independent variable on responses to a given question or series of questions in
models employing a number of independent variables, such as age, gender, income, etc.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to analyze the social spending index and
the tax fhirness index. Logistic regression was used to analyze the individual items that make
up each index. For example, homes for the homeless and capital gains are two items that
comprise the social spending index. OLS is the regression model most familiar to students who
have been exposed to statistics. Unfortunately, the OLS model assumes that dependent variables
are measured at the interval level and several of our dependent measures have a limited number
of responses typical of nominally measured variables. In such cases, it is more appropriate to
use an estimation technique that does not assume an interval level of measurement. Logistic
regression is one such technique, but one that produces estimates that are capable of
interpretation in the same manner as standard regression results. SeegeneralUyJOHNH. ALDRICH
& FORRE.ST D. NELSON, LINEAR PROBABILITY, LoGT, AND PROBrr MODELS (1984) (providing
discussion of estimation of models with limited value dependent variables).
Collinearity was assessed by regressing each of the independent variables on the remaining
independent variables. Only in cases where variables were included both independently and in
interaction with other variables did the resulting coefficients of determination exceed 0.30. In
all other cases, the independent variables were not closely related to one another. This was true
even in cases where we might have expected stronger relationships. Feminist identification, for
example, with a Pearson coefficient of 0.31, was only weakly related to ideological liberalism.
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responses that we received. We separately analyzed responses to each
of the six items in our social spending index: (1) safe houses for
abused spouses; (2) housing for homeless; (3) job training for
unemployed; (4) medical care for AIDS victims; (5) college loans; and
(6) endangered species preservation. We then analyzed the responses
to these six issues when combined to create a composite social
spending index. We also separately analyzed responses to the two
items in our tax fairness index: (1) progressive taxation; and (2) the
capital gains preference. Finally, we analyzed the responses to these
two issues when combined to create a composite tax fairness index.
III.

FINDINGS

In the materials that follow, we discuss: (1) the general nature of
our findings; (2) a detailed analysis of our findings on redistributive
spending; and (3) a detailed analysis of our findings on tax fairness.
A.

General Conclusions

The principal focus of our study was on the impact of gender and
feminist identification on attitudes toward redistributive social
spending and taxation. In general, our analysis indicated that men
are somewhat more supportive than women of redistributive tax
measures whereas women are somewhat more supportive than men
of social spending. The differences between the sexes on these issues,
however, were surprisingly small. Our data did reveal that male and
female feminists were modestly more supportive of redistributive
taxation and social spending than were non-feminists. Male feminists
proved to be stronger supporters of these issues than did female
feminists,'
As in the case of gender, our comparison involving
feminists and non-feminists as well as our comparison involving male
and female feminists revealed differences in attitudes that were only
of modest magnitude. In general, in the area of redistributivejustice,
our study did not bear out the dramatic claims made by proponents
of cultural feminist jurisprudence of the potential impact of gender

In the models with interactions, gender proved to be the central variable producing collinearity,
with an auxiliary R-square value of 0.94. To assess the impact of collinearity, separate models
were run by gender. The results of these analyses were essentially the same as those for the full
sample, suggesting that any collinearity arising from the interactions was not obscuring the
relationships identified in the regression results.
171. Because multiple regression analysis was employed in analyzing the data and our
variables included liberalism, this difference cannot be accounted for by the explanation that
male feminists could be expected to be more liberal than female feminists.

1306

THE AMERCAN UNERSrrY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1275

difference on -a redesigned legal system. 1 72 Moreover, the modest
positive impact of feminism on attitudes favoring redistributive
taxation and spending, while somewhat supportive of the radical
feminist position, cannot be viewed as a validation of that school of
jurisprudence given the modest nature of the empirical support.
In the following materials, we explain in greater detail our findings
in the areas of redistributive social spending and taxation.
B. Redistributive Social Spending
Our analysis of redistributive social spending issues produced a
blend of expected and unexpected results. 7 When we explored
the influence of control variables, 74 we were able to conclude with
a high degree of confidence that strong support for social spending
was positively associated with liberalism, Democratic party identification, and with a decrease in age. 7 Curiously, non-whites were less
supportive of social spending than were whites, although the

172. See supra notes 80-108 and accompanying text (discussing views of cultural feminists
suggesting that shifting from current male-designed legal system based on "ethos of rights" to
female-dominated "ethos of care" system would result in increased spending and support for
social issues).
173. The results for the index ofspending fairness are presented in the first column of Table
1. See infra Table 1, at 145. With a coefficient of determination, or R-square value, of 0.24, the
model does only a modest job of accounting for variance in the index. The regression
coefficients are of the expected sign and are highly significant (p < 0.05) for three of the control
variables; support for redistributive social spending increases with liberalism and Democratic
party identification and decreases with age. The coefficient of determination provides a means
for assessing the explanatory value of a regression model. The possible scores can range from
0 to 1.0. The closer the score is to 1.0, the more the independent variables account for variance
in the dependent variable of the model. In actuality, scores close to 1.0 are rare. An R-square
value of 0.24 indicates that the regression model accounts for 24% of the variance in the
spending index. See MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK, APPUED REGRESSION: AN INTRODUCTION 20-25

(1980) (explaining applied regression analysis).
The p value is an indicator of the confidence one can place in the results. A p < .05 indicates
that there is a less than one out of twenty chance that the reported regression coefficient of a
given independent variable is actually zero whereas p < .15 indicates the chance that the
regression coefficient is actually zero is only less than three out of twenty. Normally, statisticians
look for p < .05 before feeling confident of results.
None of the regression coefficients of the other control variables are significant at the usual
criterion levels. As mentioned above, the race coefficient somewhat surprisingly indicates that
whites are slightly more supportive of redistributive social spending than non-whites. See infra
note 175 and accompanying text. But while larger than its standard error, the estimate is not
discernible at even the p < 0.15 level. With this exception, however, these relationships are, as
expected, given conventional interpretations of the politics of spending.
174. The control variables are those identifiers that are assumed to be unrelated to gender
and feminism, such as age, education level, political ideology, income, race, and political party
identification.
175. See infraTable 1, at 145, lines 1, 3, and 6. Among the control variables, the regression
coefficients are of the expected sign and significance for liberalism, Democratic party
identification, and age.

1996]

REDISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND CULTURAL FEMINISM

1307

difference became less significant if spending on endangered species
was dropped from the study. v
Focusing our attention on the principal gender-feminist orientation
of our study, our data revealed a number of statistically discernible
relationships. For example, we were able to conclude with a high
degree of confidence that women are more supportive than men of
redistributive social spending. 177 Similarly, we concluded, also with
a high degree of confidence, that feminists are more likely than non78
feminists to be supportive of redistributive social spending.
Although our data did indicate that female Democrats are somewhat
more supportive of redistributive social spending than are male
Democrats, because of weak statistical relationships, we are unable to
have substantial confidence that such a result would be replicated in
another comparable sampling.7 9 One interesting impediment to
an emerging picture of gender- and feminist-based support for
redistributive social spending was the fact that our data revealed that
women feminist identifiers are far less supportive of social spending
than are male-feminist identifiers. 80
In general, however, we conclude that gender and feminist
identification seem to have a modest positive relationship to attitudes
about redistributive social spending. Analysis of the impact of
gender and feminism on each of the six individual items that
comprise our redistributive social spending index produced several
items worthy of note. While women are more supportive than men
of spending in all six categories, their support is strongest in the cases
of safe houses for abused spouses, AIDS, and college loans, and
somewhat less so in the case of housing for the homeless.' 8 1 Both

176. See infra Table 1, at 145, line 5. Unfortunately, our sample is not large enough to
enable us to distinguish among different non-white racial groups in their support for social
spending.
177. See infra Table 1, at 145, line 7. The gender regression coefficient estimate of 2.173
indicates that women are more supportive of redistributive social spending than men, and the
coefficient is significant at the p < 0.01 level.
178. See infra Table 1, at 145, line 8. Feminist identification has a significant regression
coefficient of 0.918, indicating that feminists are more likely to support redistributive spending
than non-feminists.
179. See infraTable 1, at 145, line 10. The gender-party identification regression coefficient
was also positive, indicating that female Democrats are somewhat more likely to support
redistributive social spending than male Democrats. However, because the interaction
coefficient for this data is smaller than the standard error, we cannot be certain that another
sampling would produce comparable results.
180. The data in Table 1, infra, at 145, line 9, indicates that the gender-feminist interaction
coefficient has a negative partial slope of -0.635, which is significant at the p < .01 level.
181. See infra Table 1, at 145, line 7. The gender estimate of the regression coefficients in
all six cases is positive, indicating greater support of such spending by women. This result is
significant at least at the p < 0.10 level in the four cases identified above in the text.
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men and women feminists are positive supporters of redistributive
social spending in all six categories.8 2 When we separately analyzed
the six components of our social spending index, based on genderparty identification, we found that members of the opposite sex who
belonged to the same political party demonstrated weak, mixed levels
of support for each of the separate items.1" As in the case of the
general spending index, support by women-feminist identifiers for
each of the six separate spending issues was less than the support in
each category coming from male-feminist identifiers. The difference
in support levels was greatest in the case of AIDS and to a lesser
extent for college loans and safe houses for abused women. 184 In
general, the separate spending issues generated conflicting messages
about the influence of gender and feminist identification on support
for redistributive spending.
To provide more meaning to this seemingly conflicting data, we
compared the responses of the average woman to that of the average
man, and that of the average feminist to that of the average nonfeminist. To make these two comparisons relevant to the data
produced for our entire sample, we calculated the predicted mean or
average response on our spending index for several hypothetical sets
of respondents.
We first performed this task for the "average" respondent of the
survey.' 8' On our spending scale index, which ranged between six

182. See infraTable 1, at 145, line 8. All the feminist identification regression coefficients
for the six component issues are positive and all are significant at the p < 0.01 level.
183. For example, although male Democrats were more supportive of spending for job
training for the unemployed and for endangered species than were female Democrats, this was
counterbalanced by modestly stronger support by female Democrats for the homeless and
college loans. See infra Table 1, at 145, line 10.
Not surprisingly, given the weak results reported for the composite spending index, the
gender-party identification regression coefficients reported in Table 1 are mixed in sign across
the six categories. Seesupranote 173 and accompanying text. Only one coefficientjob training
for the unemployed, is discernible at even the p < 0.10 level. See infra Table 1, at 145, line 7.
A negative coefficient forjob training indicates that female Democrats were less supportive of
this type of spending than were male Democrats, an unexpected result
184. See infra Table 1, at 145, line 9. Negative gender-feminist correlation coefficients
indicate that male feminists are more supportive of such spending than are female feminists.
The difference between the sexes is statistically most significant in the case ofsupport for AIDS
victims, where it is discernible at the p < .01 level. Also statistically significant was the greater
support by male feminists for spending on college loans and safe houses for abused spouses.
Both were discernible at the p < .05 level.
185. To be more precise, the hypothetical scenarios reported here, as well as the fairness
index, were created in the following manner to establish a mean or average prediction of the
value of a given index, values of all the independent variables were set at their observed
population means. These mean values were then multiplied by the regression coefficients
reported for that model as reported in Table 1, infra,at 145. The products were then summed.
The total represents a predicted mean for the dependent variables. The very modest differences
between the actual and predicted mean values reported in Figures 1 and 2, infra, at 147-48
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and twenty four, the average response was determined to be 19.97.
When we performed comparable calculations for a hypothetical allmale sample and a hypothetical all-female sample, the relevant
numbers were 19.87 and 20.08 respectively. The results of those
comparisons are shown in Figure 1 in the appendix. 86 While these
results reinforce our earlier conclusion that women are more
supportive than men of redistributive social spending, the magnitude
of the difference is quite small. This can be demonstrated by the
following. The composite (combined male and female) social
spending index, which generated a value of 19.97, produced a
standard deviation 1 7 of 3.23. Moving to an all-female world with an
index of 20.08 would shift the average mean only 0.11, or 3.41% of
the standard deviation of the average respondent (both male and
female) index. In other words, an all-female world-all else being the
same-would be unlikely to be dramatically more supportive of social
spending programs than our existing male-female world. 1m Comparing the all-male index of 19.87 with the all-female index of 20.08
also produces interesting results. Moving from an all-male to an allfemale sample shifts the mean of the spending fairness index by only
0.21, or 6.5% of the standard deviation for, the entire sample. From
this we conclude that the support for social spending in an all-female

(compare S1 and S2 in the two figures) indicate that our calculated predicted means well match
the actual observed mean values of the two summary dependent variables.
Our hypothetical all-male, all-female, high feminist, low feminist, Amazon, and Neanderthal
samples (terms created by us) were created in the same manner, but with one exception. In
each case, we systematically altered the value of gender, feminism, or both, prior to multiplying
those values by the regression coefficients reported in Tables 1 and 2, infra, at 145 and 146. For
example, instead of multiplying the reported regression coefficient for gender in the spending
redistribution index (2.175) by the observed mean gender score of 0.50 (indicating a sample
comprised of 50% women and 50% men), it was multiplied by a value of 1.0, indicating an allfemale world. The resulting product was then summed with the products of the other
independent variable values and their regression coefficients to produce a predicted mean value
for the spending redistribution index for a hypothetical world where women comprised the
entire population but all eise-education, age, income, and so on-remained the same. While
somewhat artificial, such simulations allow us to assess the impact of changes in value of one
variable on a given dependent variable while controlling for the impacts of other variables.
186. See infra Figure 1, at 147, lines S1, S2, S3.
187. In a normally distributed population, 68.26% of all cases will fall within plus or minus
one standard deviation of the mean, 15.87% will exceed the mean value by more than one
standard deviation, and 15.87% of all cases will have values that are more than one standard
deviation below the mean. See HUBERT M. BLALOcK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 99-101 (2d ed. 1972).
The standard deviation here is the observed standard deviation of the spending index from the
actual sample.
188. Radical feminists may assert that this merely indicates that most women have bought
into male values and that the opinions of women uninfluenced by men would be quite different
from the female opinions included in our survey. Unfortunately neither that proposition nor
its opposite is capable of empirical proof.
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world would not dramatically differ from the level of support in an allmale world, as improbable as either scenario may be.
We next measured the impact of both stronger and weaker feminist
values on our observed mean. We sought to create, through statistical
manipulation, a hypothetical world where the impact of all other
independent variables, such as income, age, and so forth, on our
composite social spending index would remain constant at their
present levels but the impact of feminism would increase markedly.
We did this by creating a social spending index where the variables
representing the impact of all independent variables other than
feminism were set at their present observed mean levels but the
impact of feminism was set at one standard deviation above its
observed mean. The result of making our existing world dramatically
more feminist was to produce a redistributive spending support index
of 20.64, a result that shifts our baseline mean index only 0.67, or
20.74% of its actual standard deviation. 89
To measure the hypothetical impact of a markedly less feminist
world, we left all other variables at their observed mean levels and set
the value of the feminist variable one standard deviation below its
observed mean. This technique, in essence, provided us with results
that would be produced if our world became markedly less feminist
but otherwise remained as it is at present. These calculations resulted
in a redistributive spending index of 19.30 and shifted the index only
0.67 from its predicted mean, or 20.74% of its actual standard
deviation.
When we compare the index of our markedly less feminist world
(19.30) with the index of our markedly more feminist world (20.64),
we observe that although strong feminist identifiers are more
supportive of redistributive social spending than are strong nonfeminists, the difference, only 41.49% of the actual standard deviation
for our sample, is not great, especially when one considers the rather
extreme nature of the assumptions made to produce this result."9
To further analyze the impact of both gender and feminism on
support for redistributive social spending, we created a predicted
spending index mean for women, which reflects greater feminist
values than the mean of those included in our study. We did this by
employing the same technique described above. We created an
entirely female mean sample and set feminist identification at one
standard deviation above its observed value while holding all other

189. The results of these calculations are reported infra Figure 1, at 147, lines SI, S4.
190. See infra Figure 1, at 147, lines S4, S5.
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variables at their means. This produced a predicted social spending
index score of 20.39, which we refer to as the "amazon index." 91
We then employed the same technique to create a spending index for
men, which dramatically reduced the impact of feminism on the male
index. We did this by setting the variables for feminist identification
for our male hypothetical sample at one standard deviation below its
observed mean but leaving all other variables at their observed means.
index value of 18.84, which we refer
This produced a social spending
92
to as the "neanderthal index."'
The difference between the predicted amazon index and the
neanderthal index is only 1.55, or 47.98% of the magnitude of the
actual standard deviation of the spending fairness index. The
difference between the predicted spending index value for all
respondents, 19.97, and the amazon index, 20.39, is only 0.42 or 13%
of the actual standard deviation for the index of all average responAs noted in our prior comparison, this difference also is
dents.'
not so great especially when one considers the extreme and utterly
unreal nature of the assumptions that are necessary to produce it.
Therefore, we conclude that the net influence of gender and feminist
identification, even when we assumed rather extreme scenarios to
assess their impact, is not great, especially considering the strong
claims often made for them.
C.

Tax Fairness

Our analysis of the tax fairness responses also produced some
Some of these results
surprising and counterintuitive results."°
were related to our study of the impact of gender and feminism, while
others were not. For example, although support for progressivity and
opposition to preferential rates for capital gains are often viewed by

191. See infra Figure 1, at 147, line S6. We coined the term "amazon index" as an editorial
convenience.
192. See infra Figure 1, at 147, line S7. We coined the term "neanderthal index" as an
editorial convenience.
193. See infra Figure 1, at 147, lines S1, S6.
194. The results of our study are reported in Table 2, infra, at 146. With a coefficient of
determination, or R-square value, of only .146, our study provides only a very modest attempt
of accounting for variance in the index.
Among the control variables, regression coefficients incorporating only income and party
identification provide statistically significant and highly reliable information. These coefficients
both indicate that Democrats and low-income individuals are likely to be strong supporters of
tax fairness issues. In both cases, the regression coefficients were significant at the p < 0.01
level.
The regression coefficient for race indicated that whites were more likely than non-whites to
support tax fairness. With a p < 0.10, however, the results are not as significant as the results
for party identification and income level.
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public finance analysts as core positions supportive of vertical tax
equity, there was only a weak correlation between the positions of a
respondent on these two issues. 95 Consistent with our expectations
was our analysis of the results related to our control variables. Our
analysis revealed that only two of the control variables strongly related
to the tax fairness index. With fairly great confidence, we were able
to conclude that lower income and Democratic party identification
were strongly associated with greater support for tax fairness. 9 ' A
similar result was obtained when separate analysis was made of each
of the two separate components of the tax fairness index, support for
97
progressive taxation, and opposition to capital gains preference.'
In addition, more highly educated individuals, liberals, and white
respondents responded with greater support for progressivity than did
their opposites.1"
The impact of both gender and feminist identification, the main
focal points of our study, on tax fairness issues was very weak.' m
Surprisingly, however, the data did indicate that women are slightly
less supportive of tax fairness than men when measured by their
responses to the capital gains issue and using our two-factor tax
fairness index.2" By a very narrow margin, women indicated greater
support for progressive taxation; however, by a slightly wider margin,
men indicted greater support for eliminating capital gains preferences. 2 ' The impact of feminist identification was uniformly positive,
as expected, but only the result using the two-factor tax fairness index
was even marginally significant." 2

195. See supranote 155 (hypothesizing that minimal public knowledge about tax issues may
account for many respondents' lukewarm support).
196. See infra Table 2, at 146, lines 4, 6. On the two-factor tax fairness index reported in
column one, both income and party identification generated coefficients that were significant
at the p < 0.01 level.
197. See infraTable 2, at 146, lines 4,6. On both the progressive tax and capital gains issues
reported in columns 2 and 3, the income and party identification coefficients were significant
at the p < 0.01 level.
198. See infra Table 2, at 146, lines 2, 3, 5. In all cases the results were significant at the
p < 0.01 level.
199. See infra Table 2, at 146, lines 7, 8. None of these results were significant at even the
p < .15 level.
200. See infra Table 2, at 146, line 7. The greater support by men for these items is indicated
by the negative signs of the regression coefficients (-.557 and-.036 respectively). In neither case,
however, was the data with respect to gender differences statistically significant and the p values
generated did not indicate that there was a strong likelihood of replicating even these modest
differences on another study.
201. See infra Table 2, at 146, line 7. The gender-based difference, however, was not
statistically significant and generated a p value that did not indicate a strong likelihood of
replicating even these modest differences in another study.
202. See infra Table 2, at 146, line 8. Only the 0.107 regression coefficient for the two-factor
tax firness index is even marginally significant (p < 0.15).
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The picture became no clearer when we examined our two
interactive variables, gender-feminist identification and gender-party
identification. Although female feminists were more supportive of tax
fairness than male feminists as measured on our two-factor tax fairness
index and our capital gains index, only the capital gains index
produced statistically significant results.0 3 Contrary to our expectations, when compared to their male counterparts, female Democratic
party identifiers proved to be less supportive of tax fairness on both
the progressive tax index and the capital gains index and, consequently, on the combined two-factor tax fairness index.2° Moreover, the
coefficient with respect to the latter index proved to be highly
significant.2 5 Our analysis indicates that, as in the case of the social
spending models, the influences of gender and feminist identification
are not simple, uniform, or consistent.
To sort out these conflicting patterns, we employed the same
simulation techniques used above for redistributive social spending
issues. 2 6 Our hypothetical mean respondent on the tax fairness
index generated an index value of 5.11 on our scale of two to
eight.2 7 When all variables other than gender were held constant
at their mean levels, a hypothetical all-female sample generated a
predicted mean tax fairness index value of 4.98. A similar calculation
for our all-male sample yielded a predicted index value of 5.27.08
Males thus proved to be more supportive of tax fairness than
women. This result, of course, is contrary to the intuitive reaction of
cultural feminists. The difference between the male and female
indices is only 0.32, or 21.6% of the observed standard deviation of
the tax fairness index of 1.48. Shifting from our predicted present
world mean with a tax fairness index of 5.11 to an all-female scenario
would entail a downward shift of the mean of only 0.16, or 10.81% of
the observed standard deviation of the sample. While this indicates
that women are less supportive of tax fairness than the general malefemale population, the difference is far from profound.
Results more consistent with our expectations were obtained when
we calculated predicted tax fairness index values for respondents that

203. See infraTable 2, at 146, line 9. The 0.267 regression coefficient on the capital gains
issue was significant at the level of p < 0.05.
204. See infra Table 2, at 146, line 10. Only with respect to the two-factor tax fairness index
was this data highly reliable with a p < 0.01.
205. See infra Table 2, at 146, line 6.
206. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
207. For a discussion of how this value was derived in the spending context, see supranote
185 and accompanying text.

208. See infra Figure 2, at 148. Compare lines S1, S2 and S3.
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reflected greater feminist values than the mean of all those included
in our study. As with redistributive social spending, we calculated a
predicted mean index value for all respondents but set feminist
identification one standard deviation above its observed value and
held all other variables at their means. 2°
When the feministadjusted mean index value was multiplied by the regression coefficients reported in the first column of Table 2, a predicted tax fairness
index value of 5.28 resulted.210 We then created a predicted tax
fairness index value that reflected less feminist identification than the
mean index produced in our study by holding all variables constant
and setting the mean value for feminist identification one standard
deviation below its mean. This produced a tax fairness index value
of 4.93.211 These results produced a shift of only 23.64% of the
observed standard deviation of the tax fairness index and indicate
that, while both male and female feminists are more supportive of tax
fairness than are non-feminists, the difference between feminists and
nonfeminists is not profound. Moreover, statistically adjusting the
predicted tax fairness indices to reflect more or less feminist
identification (5.28 and 4.93, respectively) resulted in a shift of only
0.18, or 12.16% of the standard deviation, from the 5.11 tax fairness
of our present world. While the differences between these indices are
significant, they are far from profound.
As in the case of our spending analysis, we further analyzed the
impact of gender and feminism on support for redistributive taxation
by calculating amazon 12 and neanderthal 23 indices for tax fairness. We did this by setting feminist identification one standard
deviation above its observed value and holding all other variables at
their means. 4 This produced a predicted tax fairness index value
of 5.17, which we refer to as the amazon index.1 We then created
a tax fairness index for men, which dramatically reduced the impact
of feminism on the male index, by setting the variable for feminist
identification for our hypothetical male mean sample one standard
deviation below its observed mean, but leaving all other variables at

209. Seesupranotes 189-90 and accompanying text (explaining use of this technique in social
spending portion of article).
210. See infra Figure 2, at 148, line 54.
211. See infra Figure 2, at 148, line S5.
212. See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (explaining procedure for calculating
amazon index). The resulting amazon index for tax fairness was 5.17.
213. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (explaining procedure for calculating
neanderthal index). The resulting tax fairness neanderthal index was 5.15.
214. Seesupranotes 191-92 and accompanying text (explaining use of this technique in social
spending portion of article).
215. See infra Table 2, at 148, line S6.
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their observed means. This produced a tax fairness index value of
5.15, which we refer to as the neanderthal index.216
The difference between the tax fairness amazon and neanderthal
indices (0.02, or 1.35% of the tax fairness standard deviation) is
completely inconsequential and statistically insignificant. Moreover,
moving from the current world and its mean tax fairness index of
5.11 to the all-woman, strongly feminist scenario shifts the mean
upward only 0.06, or 4.05% of its actual standard derivation. Indeed,
it is interesting that the predicted means of the two extreme scenarios
are both higher than the predicted mean for the total sample as
presently realized. In general, we conclude that the net influence of
gender and feminist identification cancel each other so that there is
virtually'no difference between the predictions generated by these
starkly different scenarios.
CONCLUSION

The female-oriented ethos of care, with its emphasis on
communitarian values, should intuitively result in women being
dramatically more supportive of redistributive justice measures than
are men. Our data, however, indicate that there is little difference
between women and men in their attitudes toward major
redistributive justice issues involving tax fairness and social spending.
Although women favored social spending to a slightly higher degree
than men, they were slightly less favorably disposed toward tax fairness
than men. The results are not supportive of the cultural feminist
position. Moreover, our data indicated that other variables, such as
income, age, party identification, and general support of liberal
programs are at least as, and on occasion more, important in
predicting support for tax fairness or social spending.
We can offer several possible explanations of the disparity between
our results and the observation of cultural feminist psychologists, such
as Professor Gilligan, on the differences between male and female
behavior in their approaches toward individual personal moral
behavior. First, it is possible that while men and women might speak
in different voices on the micro-societal level, they may not do so on
the macro level. Thus, while men might emphasize autonomy,
individual rights, and justice and women might emphasize care,
connectedness, and responsibility when forming opinions on moral
issues on the interpersonal level, the two genders may speak in the
same voice when addressing issues on the national level. Second, the
216. See infraTable 2, at 148, line S7.
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older psychological studies, from where much of this controversy
springs, did not control for differences in education between the
sexes. Regression analysis, such as we employed, has the effect of
controlling for differences in variables such as education. Once this
was done with these older studies, the differences between the sexes
evaporated. 1 7 Moreover, if differences between the sexes in educational levels or other factors such as income, age, party affiliation, or
liberalism account for differences in attitudes toward issues, regression
analysis will expose that fact. This likely explains the failure of gender
to emerge as a significant factor in determining support for
redistributive justice.
Third, because women have historically
experienced the power of the state as more confining of personal
liberties and potential than men have, it is possible that their distrust
of government as an arbiter of redistributivejustice might mitigate the
otherwise likely impact of their ethos of care. This distrust may act to
somewhat restrain their natural instincts toward programs that
promise care when the government provides that care.
Although our study is helpful in evaluating the legitimacy of
cultural feminist jurisprudence in the area of redistributive justice, it
provides only modest insight into weighing the claims of competing
schools of feminist jurisprudence. Our study provides little, if any,
data that is of value on the subject of liberal feminism, although it
provides some modest insight into evaluating the claims of postmodern and radical feminism.
If one views the opinions of women feminists as a proxy for an
opinion uninfluenced by male domination, it might enable one to
make some tentative conclusions regarding the radical feminist
perspective. Our analysis indicates that feminism has only a modest
impact on the formation of attitudes toward redistributive justice.
Moreover, male feminists emerged as more supportive of
redistributive justice than female feminists. These facts hardly allow
us to conclude that a legal structure that was not dominated by male
opinion would be more supportive of redistributive justice than our
present system of laws. Radical feminists may criticize the use of a
woman's feminist self-identification as a proxy for the undominated
woman's position, and we surely must concede that not all female selfidentifiers could be classified as not dominated or imprinted by males.
Nonetheless, it is in this group of women where one would expect to
find such individuals. Given the very modest impact of feminism on

217. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (positing that gender affects societal attitudes
and individual moral behavior).
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shaping women's opinions on redistributive justice, we cannot
conclude that women, in a world free of male domination, would
significantly provide stronger support for redistributive justice than
women provide at present in the existing environment.
Given the demonstrated importance of other factors such as
income, age, party identification, and support for liberalism in
predicting support for redistributive justice, the post-modem
feminists, with their emphasis on the diversity of women's experiences, might draw support from our conclusions. However, because of
two main reasons, even they would be hardpressed to point to our
data as offering strong empirical support for their philosophy in
general. First, the conclusions supported by our data must be limited
to the redistributive justice issues studied and cannot be used to
generalize about the overall validity of different schools of jurisprudence. Second, given the modest impact of gender and feminism on
support for redistributive justice, we cannot conclude that postmodem feminism provides a clear explanation for variations in the
levels of support for redistributive justice.
We caution that the primary conclusions that we draw about
cultural feminism, and our secondary conclusions about radical and
post-modem feminism, are limited to the subject matters included in
our survey. We can offer no comments on the validity of the
observations of proponents of these schools ofjurisprudence in other
areas of the law. Moreover, even in the two subject matter areas of
our study, tax fairness and social spendings, our data and conclusions
are limited in time and to the issues tested. Perhaps, in later
generations, gender and feminist identification might prove to be
significant in forming opinions on redistributive justice issues that
significantly vary from those of the general population. At present,
however, that is not the case.
In closing, we wish to present one additional thought. We believe
that the methodology and techniques of analysis employed in this
study offer significant new opportunities for verifying a variety of
theoretical claims. The potential applications of these techniques
range far beyond the immediate exercise undertaken in this study.
Our society, in general, and the legal profession, specifically, have a
keen interest in working to ensure that our social norms reflect the
multitude of interests in our increasingly diverse society. Given that
goal, we believe that our research demonstrates the need to verify
empirically the true opinions of our various national constituencies
and to match the resulting data against the claims of theoreticians
who seek to speak for various groups. To allow theorists, regardless
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of their good intentions, to articulate their version of the message of
previously excluded voices is merely to substitute a new form of
dominance for an old one. It is far more preferable to allow all
excluded components to speak for themselves.
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Table 1: Spending Fairness Regression Results
Indep.
Variables

Spend
Index

Safe
House

Age

-.388**
-. 172**
(.157)2
(.083)
Education
.168
.260***
(.141)
(.072)
Liberalism
.226***
.153***
(.075)
(.039)
Income
-. 017
-. 104***
(.069)
(.037)
Race
.576
.294
(White-Hi)
(.389)
(.195)
Party ID
.276***
.118**
(Dem=Hi)
(.086)
(.048)
Gender
2.173*** 1.425***
(Fan.Hi) (.740)
(.410)
Feminism
.918***
.356***
(.146)
(.089)
Gend.-Fem. -. 635*** -. 308**
(.219)
(.126)
Gender.023
-. 074
PartylD
(.116)
(.064)
Interc. 1
14.976
-1.136
Interc. 2
.658
Interc. 3
2.667
RF2

.240

X

-

Gamma
n

512

Dependent Variables'
Homes
Job
Support
Homeless Training for AIDS
-. 072
-.014
-. 232**
(.084)
(.088)
(.085)
.120#
.199*** -. 043
(.074)
(.076)
(.074)
.054
.131**
.204***
(.039)
(.042)
(.040)
-.059#
-. 078**
.014
(.038)
(.040)
(.039)
.171
-. 239
-.564**
(.200)
(.216)
(.222)
'.178***
.081#
.087*
(.048)
(.050)
(.049)
.749*
.561
1.134***
(.413)
(.429)
(.419)
.326***
.379***
.525***
(.088)
(.093)
(.091)
-. 134
-. 128
-. 340***
(.127)
(.135)
(.130)
.009
-. 005*
-. 024
(.065)
(.068)
(.066)
-1.302
-2.085
-2.882
.123
-. 485
-1.453
2.431
1.831
.785

College
Loans
-. 287**
(.086)
.037
(.074)
.177***
(.041)
-.017
(.039)
-. 156
(.210)
.023
(.050)
1.167***
(.420)
.319***
(.091)
-. 324**
(.127)
.025
(.066)
-.148
.144
4.343

Endang.
Species
.305***
(.084)
.052
(.072)
.058#
(.038)
-. 064*
(.037)
.378**
(.190)
.120**
(.047)
.554
(.399)
.444***
(.087)
-. 183#
(.123)
-. 031
(.063)
-1.395
-. 046
1.972

117.179

54.128

55.293

67.843

27.930

18.535

.283
836

.341
839

.323
844

.361
816

.290
838

.315
820

* = p < .10; ** = p < .05; *** = p < .01; # = p < .15 Where no such sign is present, p exceeds

.15.

1. The dependent variables are coded so that high values represent viewing spending as fair.
2. The figures in parentheses are standard errors and the figures above them that are not in
parentheses are the regression coefficients.
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Table 2: Tax Fairness Regression Results
Indep. Variables
Age
Education
Liberalism
Income
Race
Party ID
(Dem-Hi)
Gender
(Fe. -Hi)
Feminism
Gend.-Fem.

Tax Index

Dependent Variables'
Progressive Taxation

-.037
(.072)2
.016
(.064)
.020
(.032)

.124
(.080)

-. 109"**

-. 141***
(.036)

(.032)
.318*
(.177)
.211***
(.040)
-. 036
(.338)
.107#
(.066)
.097
(.100)

Gender-PartylD

-. 147"***

Interc. 1

(.053)
4.257

.238***

(.070)
.109***
(.037)

1.018***
(.186)
.220***
(.047)
.175
(.386)
.043

(.083)
-.083
(.118)
-.083
(.061)
.237

Interc. 2

1.881

Interc. 3

3.610

R2
X2
Gamma
n

.146
83.614
.191
512

40.991
.249
824

Capital Gains
-. 046
(.092)
.045
(.081)
.036
(.043)
-. 139***
(.040)
.083
(.220)
.142***
(.051)
-.557
(.438)
.038
(.088)
.267**
(.131)
-. 083
(.069)
-. 925
1.094
2.847
49.010
.270
642

* = p <.10; ** = p <.05; *** = p <.01; # = p <.15 Where no such sign is present p exceeds .15.
1. The dependent variables are coded so that high values represent viewing progressivity and
no separate rate for capital gains positively.
2. The figures in parentheses are standard errors and the figures above them that are not in

parentheses are the regression coefficients.
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Figure 1: Predicted Mean Value of Redistributive Spending Index
Under Alternative Gender and Feminist Identification Scenarios
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Predicted Mean of Redistributive Spending Index
The actual mean of our sample appears on the first line. The mean of our average
respondent is on line SI, that of the all female sample is on line S2, and that of the all male
sample is on line S3. Line S4 reports the mean for a markedly more feminist average
respondent (feminist component computed at one standard deviation above the mean) and
line S5 for a markedly less feminist average respondent (with the feminist component
computed at one standard deviation below the mean). Line S6 represents a markedly more
feminist all female world while line S7 represents a markedly less feminist all male world with
such calculations being made by setting feminist components of the respective samples one
standard deviation above and below the mean for each gender.
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Figure 2: Predicted Mean Value of Redistributive Taxation Index
Under Alternative Gender and Feminist Identification Scenarios*
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SSee footnote at the bottom of Figure 1 for an explanation of each line in the bar graph.

